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“Looking at the economic realities, it seems clear that an employee is selling
his labor primarily to obtain a livelihood, not making an investment.”1
Many corporate employees behave less like old-fashioned workers than they
do like investors. Rather than think, I need to stay here and do my best
because I have an investment in this company, they think, I am going to
keep a close eye on this ship, in case it starts to sink and my options become
worthless.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Stock options were the preferred compensation of the Internet boom.
Once the exclusive domain of top-tier executives, stock options became a
crucial part of the employment packages for employees at all levels.3
Although specific numbers are difficult to come by, estimates of the number
of employees with stock options in the late 1990s ranged from seven to ten
million,4 up from one million in 1992.5 Given the stratospheric stock prices
of many technology companies at the time, options represented a potential
gold mine for employees, while the tight job market made employers more
willing to offer such options to lure the best talent.6 For high-tech
1. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979).
2. Michael Lewis, The Artist in the Gray Flannel Pajamas, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2000, § 6
(Magazine), at 45, 46–47.
3. See Sheila Muto, Stock Options Spur Lawsuits as Mergers Roil High Tech, WALL ST. J., Sept.
27, 2000, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 26611067 (noting that newly hired Silicon Valley executives
are given stock options averaging 117,588 shares valued at $685,234, while hourly workers
receive, on average, 1603 shares valued at $12,576). According to a study by consulting firm
William M. Mercer, Inc., 54% of large United States companies have a broad based stock option
plan, up from 30% in 1997. See Press Release, William M. Mercer, Inc., Sustained Bull Market
Drove Use of Broad-Based Stock Options to New Heights, available at
http://www.mercerhr.com/pressrelease/details.jhtml?idContent=1048255 (last visited Jan. 27,
2003) (on file with the Iowa Law Review). A study by Joseph Blasi, Douglas Kruse, and Aaron
Bernstein revealed that 98 out of the top 100 high tech firms offer stock options to most or all
of their employees. JOSEPH BLASI ET AL., IN THE COMPANY OF OWNERS 92 (2003).
4. Employee Stock Options: Top 10 Things to Know, http://money.cnn.com/pf/101/plus/
lessons/10/topten.html (seven million) (last visited Jan. 27, 2003) (on file with the Iowa Law
Review); The National Center for Employee Ownership, Employee Stock Options Fact Sheet,
available at http://www.nceo.org/library/optionfact.html [hereinafter NCEO Fact Sheet] (ten
million) (last visited Jan. 27, 2003) (on file with the Iowa Law Review). A survey by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics determined that 1.7% of all private industry employees received stock options
in 1999. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Pilot Survey on the Incidence of Stock
Options in Private Industry in 1999, Oct. 11, 2000, at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ocs/sp/
ncnr0001.txt (last visited Jan. 27, 2003) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
5. Corey Rosen, Employee Stock Options Are Here to Stay, available at http://www.neco.org/
library/heretostay.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2003) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
6. Options also do not cost companies cash value to issue, other than diluted share value,
and potentially save them money on payroll costs. See Gretchen Morgenson, Options Seem to Be
Coming Home to Roost, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2000, § 3, at 1, available at 2000 WL 28280871.
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employees, the value and vesting dates of one’s options became more
important numbers than one’s salary.
Then, in spring 2000 the boom went bust. Many stocks, particularly in
technology and telecommunications companies, have seen their prices fall
to pennies.7 The heady hysteria that disparaged companies in the “old
economy” and brought new methods of valuation into vogue left in its wake
a junk heap of companies whose IPOs had only recently been heralded. For
some of these companies, investors are finding that fraud and deception
helped create the illusion that the bull market fostered. Firms such as
Enron, Global Crossing, and WorldCom—once top-fliers in the new new
economy—now are the subject of wide-ranging criminal investigations and
massive securities fraud actions.8 Like other investors, employees with stock
options have also seen the value of those options fall off the charts.9 No
longer able to cash in on their options, employees may now seek to exercise
other powers behind those options—powers which potentially include the
right to sue.
Under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193410 and the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s effectuation of the Act, Rule 10b-5,11
private holders of securities may bring actions against those who have used
fraud or misrepresentation in connection with the sale or purchase of a
security. Rule 10b-5 offers perhaps the most important legal protection for
holders of securities against fraud, deception, insider trading, and corporate
malfeasance. However, in two recent decisions involving Cendant
Corporation, a federal district court dismissed claims under Rule 10b-5
brought by employees who held stock options.12  The court based its
decisions on Rule 10b-5’s requirement that the alleged fraud must have
7. See, e.g., Danny Hakim, Former Workers at Lucent See Nest Eggs Vanish, Too, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 29, 2001, at A1, available at 2001 WL 27393203; Christopher Saunders, theglobe.com to Close
Communities, ATNEWYORK.COM, Aug. 3, 2001, at http://www.atnewyork.com/news/article.php/
8471_860141 (last visited Jan. 27, 2003) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
8. See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC), 2002 WL 31867720
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2002); SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963 (JSR), 2002 WL 31748604
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2002); Newby v. Enron Corp., [2001–2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 91,706 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2002), 2002 WL 31989193; PETER C. FUSARO & ROSS M.
MILLER, WHAT WENT WRONG AT ENRON (2002).
9. See Gretchen Morgenson, Outrage Is Rising as Options Turn to Dust, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31,
2002, § 3, at 1, available at 2002 WL 18535027 (last visited Jan. 27, 2003) (on file with the Iowa
Law Review) (discussing WorldCom employees); Jeff Manning & Gail Kinsey Hill, Portland
Subsidiary Mirrors Enron’s Rapid Rise, Fall, OREGONIAN, Dec. 16, 2001, available at 2001 WL
3627620, reprinted in THE BEST BUSINESS STORIES OF THE YEAR: 2003 EDITION 84–86 (Andrew
Leckey & Allan Sloan eds., 2003) (discussing employees of Enron Broadband whose stock
options are now worthless).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002).
12. See Wyatt v. Cendant Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 550, 558 (D.N.J. 2000); McLaughlin v.
Cendant Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 539, 550 (D.N.J. 1999).
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taken place “in connection with a purchase or sale” of the security.13 Because
the employees had received their options through a company-wide plan,
rather than through individual negotiations with the company, they had not
“purchased” their security and thus were not entitled to bring a 10b-5
action.14 The decisions in the Cendant litigation are the logical outgrowth of
reasoning first set forth in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,15 in
which the Supreme Court held that employees did not “contribute” to their
pension plans and therefore were not protected under the federal securities
laws.16 This line of reasoning, premised on the assumption that employees
have not bargained for benefits such as pension plans or stock options, is
fundamentally flawed.
Of course, employees are different than outside investors, and one may
question whether employees need or deserve the protections of federal
securities regulation. For example, employees have access to different
information about the company and are arguably better able to protect
themselves against fraud or malfeasance by company executives.17 The
recent scandals at Enron and WorldCom demonstrate, however, that most
employees are just as vulnerable to insider fraud as the public. Unprotected
by Rule 10b-5, employees must watch the value of their options disintegrate
without a legal remedy against the employer that misled them.
This Article argues that employees deserve the basic antifraud
protection afforded by Rule 10b-5—a protection that public investors are
not even permitted to waive. Sections II and III provide an overview of Rule
10b-5 litigation and employee stock options. Section IV analyzes the logic
behind the Cendant decisions, beginning with the framework established by
the Supreme Court in Daniel. Section V argues that the Cendant distinction is
flawed on both doctrine and policy. Section VI discusses—and rejects—
potential reasons for a broader rule barring all employees from Rule 10b-5
private actions related to their options. Ultimately, the best rule is uniform
antifraud protection for all employees who receive stock options.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF RULE 10B-5
Rule 10b-5 is considered the “crown jewel” out of the many provisions
for securities regulation deriving from the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933
Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act) (collectively,
the Securities Acts).18 Having sprung from famously inconspicuous
13. See Wyatt, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 555–56; McLaughlin, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 544 (noting that
Rule 10b-5 “prohibits the use of fraudulent schemes or devices in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities”).
14. See Wyatt, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 557–58; McLaughlin, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 544–45.
15. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
16. Id. at 570.
17. See infra Section VI.B.
18. Donald C. Langevoort, Rule 10b-5 as an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S7, S19 (1993).
BODIE_CONV 03/15/03 9:55 PM
544 88  IOWA LAW REVIEW [2003]
circumstances,19 the rule has now become the “catch-all” cause of action for
cases of corporate malfeasance.20 Rule 10b-5 generally prohibits any fraud,
deception, or omission relating to a material fact in the context of a
purchase or sale. The rule has been held to prohibit accounting fraud,
insider trading, misleading or deceptive solicitations, and failures to
disclose.21 Although Rule 10b-5 is the primary method of prosecuting insider
trading,22 it finds perhaps a more important role as the vehicle for
shareholder derivative class actions. Shareholder suits against Enron, Arthur
Andersen, WorldCom, and Global Crossing all have been filed under the
flag of Rule 10b-5.23
The rule derives from section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, which makes it
unlawful to “use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” that
contravenes any rule promulgated by the SEC.24 Rule 10b-5 tracks this
language and sets forth three types of unlawful practices:
To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person . . . .25
The rule requires that the alleged wrongful actions be committed
19. Former SEC staff attorney Milton Freeman, in an oft-recounted tale, described how
the rule was created in response to a specific incident of fraud relating to an executive’s efforts
to buy, rather than sell, securities. The rule borrows the language of section 17 of the 1933 Act,
except that it applies to sales and purchases, rather than sales and offers to sell. See 15 U.S.C. §
77q(a) (2000). After Freeman and an SEC director wrote up the rule, it was approved by the
Commission without controversy. The only comment allegedly made about the rule came from
Commissioner Sumner Pike, who said, “Well, we are against fraud, aren’t we?” Milton Freeman,
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 BUS. LAW. 793, 922 (1967), quoted in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 767 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
20. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976).
21. Langevoort, supra note 18, at S11–15.
22. Most recently, the Supreme Court affirmed a conviction under Rule 10b-5 using the
“misappropriation” theory, which concerns a person’s use of confidential information for
securities trading purposes in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information. United
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
23. In re Global Crossing Ltd. Sec. and ERISA Litig., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1384 (J.P.M.L. 2002);
In re MCI WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 778 (S.D. Miss. 2002); In re Enron Corp.
Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. 427 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000).
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through means of interstate commerce and “in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.”26 Upon its creation in 1942, Rule 10b-5 was
used solely by the SEC in its enforcement of the securities acts. However, in
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,27 a district court found an implied private
right of action under the rule. This private right was not approved by the
Supreme Court until twenty-five years later, in summary fashion.28 By then,
as the Court recognized in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, the Rule
10b-5 private action was a “judicial oak which ha[d] grown from little more
than a legislative acorn.”29
To bring a private action under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must prove the
following: “the defendant made (1) a misstatement or an omission (2) of a
material fact (3) with scienter . . . (4) in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security (5) upon which plaintiff reasonably relied, and (6) that
reliance proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.”30 One of the legal issues
that soon arose in the development of Rule 10b-5’s private action was the
meaning of the phrase “in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.” In Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,31 the Second Circuit held that
only direct purchasers and sellers of securities, rather than those who were
connected in some other way to a sale (or those who had chosen not to
make a sale or purchase), could bring private actions. The court based its
decision on the purpose behind the rule, which it viewed as limiting redress
to those engaged in an actual transaction.32 The Supreme Court ratified the
Birnbaum rule many years later in Blue Chip Stamps.33 The Court based its
holding, in part, on Birnbaum’s longstanding acceptance by the circuit courts
and Congress’s failure to overturn the decision, despite the SEC’s efforts to
do so.34 However, because the Rule 10b-5 private action was primarily a
judicial creation, the Court felt it “proper” to take policy considerations into
account as well.35 The court recognized that many commentators, as well as
the SEC, viewed the limitation to direct buyers and sellers as an arbitrary
restriction that prevented aggrieved plaintiffs from getting relief, and
26. Id.
27. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
28. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); see also
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150–54 (1972).
29. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
30. McLaughlin v. Cendant Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 539, 543 (D.N.J. 1999).
31. 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952).
32. The court quoted an SEC release, which stated that the rule was intended to close a
“loophole in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting
individuals or companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase.” Id. at
463 (quoting Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942), 1942 WL
34443.
33. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
34. Id. at 733.
35. Id. at 737.
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admitted that this was “indeed a disadvantage.”36 Despite this disadvantage,
however, the Court argued that the Birnbaum rule also had several
advantages, primarily cordoning off suits that would be more speculative
than those brought by actual buyers or sellers. The Court feared that suits by
parties not involved in an actual transaction “would throw open to the trier
of fact many rather hazy issues of historical fact the proof of which
depended almost entirely on oral testimony.”37 Noting that Rule 10b-5
actions presented “a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and kind
from that which accompanies litigation in general,” the Court feared that
even suits with little chance of success would have a significant settlement
value.38 Without the Birnbaum rule, plaintiffs could fill complaints with vague
allegations about what they would have done but for the fraud and then
engage in extensive and abusive discovery to drive up the value of
settlement.39 These considerations led the Court to limit the plaintiff class
for Rule 10b-5 private actions to actual purchasers or sellers of securities,
rather than any party who had been defrauded.
Further concern about vexatious litigation led Congress to pass the
1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).40 The PSLRA
heightened pleading requirements and changed class action procedures in
an effort to discourage frivolous Rule 10b-5 litigation. Following passage of
the PSLRA, some plaintiffs began to seek relief through state securities laws.
Congress largely eliminated that option, however, by passing the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), which preempts most state
court securities fraud class actions.41 Thus, Rule 10b-5 remains the focus for
almost all securities class actions seeking relief for alleged fraud.
III. A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS
Stock options are a deceptively straightforward type of contract: the
issuer of a stock gives to the recipient the “option” to purchase a share or
shares of the stock at a particular price with whatever restrictions the
contract may contain. The option is only valuable if the value of the stock
rises above the price term set within the option. While this basic notion of an
option is quite simple, stock options themselves often are not, given the
array of contractual restrictions that can be placed on them. In the context
of employee stock options, it is common for the company to require that the
options “vest” over time; that is, the employee can only exercise the options
36. Id. at 738.
37. Id. at 743.
38. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 739.
39. Id. at 740–41.
40. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995)
(codified throughout various sections of 15 U.S.C.).
41. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (1998) (codified throughout various sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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after a period of time has elapsed. Moreover, employees may forfeit their
options under the contract once they leave the company, even if they leave
involuntarily.42 Further provisions may control what happens if the issuing
company is bought or merges with another company, or may even give
management the prerogative to buy back the options at their original strike
price.43
Employee stock options are covered by a complex cross-pattern of
regulation and common law. Employee stock options are considered
securities and thus are covered by federal securities regulation. However,
stock options also represent a contract, and thus fall within the ambit of
state common law. Congress has largely not preempted state common law
with respect to securities regulation, with some notable exceptions.44 In
addition, state corporate law regulates the decision to offer employees stock
options, sometimes requiring a proxy vote on options to executives and
employees.45 However, because options are simply that—options—
employees do not have an actual ownership stake in the firm until they
exercise their options and purchase shares. Employee stock option plans are
generally not covered under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA),46 as they are not considered welfare or retirement plans, even
though employees may consider their options as part of their retirement
savings.47 Finally, if the plan meets the requirements of an “incentive stock
option” or an “employee stock purchase plan,” the options will receive
certain federal tax benefits.48 However, the requirements for obtaining such
tax treatment are somewhat restrictive, requiring employers to offer the
options to all employees (in the case of stock purchase plans)49 or requiring
42. The issue of whether employees who are wrongfully discharged can obtain relief for
lost stock options and, if so, how these options should be valued, has been the subject of recent
litigation. See, e.g., Knox v. Microsoft Corp., 962 P.2d 839 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
43. The story of how Steve Jobs used such a provision to reorganize Pixar and divest
employees of their options is told in CHARLES H. FERGUSON, HIGH ST@KES, NO PRISONERS 98–
99 (1999).
44. See, e.g., SLUSA, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified throughout
various sections of 15 U.S.C.) (discussed supra  Section II).
45. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 505(d) (McKinney 1986). However, Delaware law does
not require shareholder approval. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157(c) (1974).
46. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2000).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 3(2) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(c) (2001).
48. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 422–23 (2000). For example, the grant of the options will not be a
taxable event as long as the employee exercises them while still an employee and holds the
stock for at least a year. See 26 U.S.C. § 422 (2000). The tax consequences for employees who
cash in on options can be quite significant. See Gretchen Morgenson, Some Suffer Tax Hangovers
From Microsoft Option Spree, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2001, at A1, available at 2001 WL 18773094.
49. See 26 U.S.C. § 423(b)(4) (2000). This provision led the Ninth Circuit to find that
Microsoft workers who had been labeled as independent contractors and thereby excluded
from the stock option plan were actually employees and thus entitled to participate in the plan.
See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997).
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that the option be for at least fair market value with a ten-year expiration
date (for incentive stock options).50
Employers have several incentives for offering their employees stock
options. First, as discussed in more depth below, these options are not
reported as expenses against earnings. Unlike wages, which are part of net
expenses, stock options are not given a fixed value and are not counted as
costs.51 Employers may nevertheless be permitted to take a tax deduction for
options if they are not incentive stock options. Second, options are often
seen as a way to align employees’ incentives with the interests of the
shareholders.52 Like other forms of employee ownership, stock options give
employees a direct stake in the value of the employer’s equity.53 Third, stock
options may bind the employee to the company, at least for as long as it
takes for the employee’s options to vest. While this may not be a long period
of time, it does provide some stability, particularly in a labor market with
accelerated turnover. Fourth, stock options may signal to investors that
managers and employees are willing to accept contingent compensation,
thus demonstrating that they believe in the enterprise. If those running the
company are unwilling to take some risk in the firm’s success, investors may
deem the enterprise unworthy of their own risk.54 Finally, employees may
demand stock options based on a cultural sense of compensation. Stock
options bring not only investment opportunities but prestige; if employees
in a company or industry are receiving options, it may spur other employees
to bargain for them.
One recent source of concern with respect to stock options has been
their treatment under the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
As previously noted, firms are not required under GAAP to count options as
expenses against earnings.55 Recent legislative efforts to change that, most
50. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 422(b)(3)–(4) (2000).
51. However, since 1998, accounting standards have required companies to disclose the
dilutive effect that options have on share value. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FIN.
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 123, ACCOUNT FOR STOCK-BASED COMP. § 49 (1998), cited in
Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions—Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for Performance, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 284 (1999).
52. See, e.g., Arthur H. Dean, Employee Stock Options, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1403–04
(1953).
53. Of course, stock options do not actually provide employees with stock (unless those
options are exercised), so employers need not worry about employees exercising control of the
corporation upon receipt of the options. Further research is needed into how many employees
exercise their options, and how long they hold on to the stock once it has been purchased.
54. See Edward Lazear, Output-based Pay: Incentives or Sorting?, National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper Series, Nov. 1999, available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w7419 (last visited Jan. 27, 2003) (on file with the Iowa Law Review). An illustration of
the risks of using critical personnel who have no stake in a venture can be found in PO
BRONSON, THE NUDIST ON THE LATE SHIFT 98–138 (1999).
55. See supra note 51.
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notably by Senators Levin and McCain, have not been successful.56 Despite
these legislative failures, however, some companies, such as Coca-Cola,
General Motors, and General Electric, have decided to voluntarily list their
stock options as expenses.57 Opponents of the current accounting rules
claim that the failure to expense stock options artificially inflates the bottom
line of those companies that grant options and therefore contributed to the
recent boom and bust in technology stocks. Proponents of the current rules
argue that stock options are administratively difficult to price and note that
companies already disclose their stock option grants to investors. Some
proponents have also expressed concern that companies with broad-based
stock option plans would be forced to curtail or end those plans if the
accounting rules changed.58
Finally, it is important to note that stock options are just one form of
ownership interest in an employer that an employee may hold. Employees
can purchase an employer’s stock on the open market or through their
401(k) plans; they may also receive such stock directly from their employer
as a bonus. Other ownership interests include phantom stock, which
provides employees with the right to receive the appreciation in value of the
employer’s stock without actually holding the stock, as well as employee
stock ownership plans or ESOPs (retirement plans that invest primarily, if
not exclusively, in employer stock). While all of these forms of ownership
interest provide employees with a financial stake in the success of the firm,
they each differ in important respects. For example, stock generally provides
voting rights to the holder, but stock options and phantom stock do not
provide voting rights, and ESOP participants are often represented by a
trustee before their shares vest. ERISA provides protection for employees
with employer stock held through an ESOP or 401(k) plan, but not for
56. The Ending the Double Standard for Stock Options Act, introduced by Senator Levin
along with Senator McCain and other co-sponsors, would provide that corporate tax benefits
from stock option compensation expenses are allowed only to the extent such expenses are
included in a corporation’s financial statements. See S. 1940, 107th Cong. (2002). The bill was
before the Senate Committee on Finance in 2002; Senator McCain unsuccessfully tried to
attach it to the recently enacted Corporate Reform Act. See Helen Dewar & David S. Hilzenrath,
McCain Accounting Proposal Scuttled; Senate Rejects Listing of Stock Options as a Corporate Expense,
WASH. POST, July 12, 2002, at A1, A7, available at 2002 WL 23852949. The Stock Option
Accounting Reform Act, which would require the Financial Accounting Standards Board to
develop standards requiring stock options to be expensed, was referred to committee. See H.R.
5147, 107th Cong. (2002).
57. See Danny Hakim, G.M. Plans to List Its Options as Expenses, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2002, at
C3, available at 2002 WL 25399658; Floyd Norris & Sherri Day, Coke to Report Stock Options as an
Expense, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2002, at A1, available at 2002 WL 24462267.
58. See The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, (PBS television broadcast, July 16, 2002), available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-dec02/options_7-16.html) [hereinafter
NewsHour Transcript] (featuring a statement by Rick White, president and CEO of Technet, a
national association of technology firms: “what we’re particularly concerned about is [that] the
effect will be that companies can no longer give options to rank-and-file employees”).
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employees with stock options or with stock bought on the open market.
Some of the analysis discussed below concerning stock options could apply
to other employee ownership interests; for example, a court could find that
stock provided to employees through a stock bonus plan did not represent a
“purchase or sale” for purposes of Rule 10b-5. However, because the recent
Cendant cases concern stock option plans, as well as the recent popularity of
stock options for employees, this Article will focus its analysis on stock
options.
IV. EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS AND
RULE 10B-5’S “PURCHASE OR SALE” REQUIREMENT
In the Cendant cases, employees who held stock options brought suits
under Rule 10b-5 alleging that they had been defrauded by Cendant when
those options were issued.59 The district court, however, held that the
employees, who had received their options through a stock option plan,
could not sue for fraud under Rule 10b-5.60 The court determined that the
employees had not acquired their options through a purchase or sale, and
thus did not meet the requirements of Rule 10b-5.61 To explain how the
court reached this decision, this Article begins with a discussion of the
Supreme Court’s decision in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,
which held that pension plans were not “securities” for purposes of federal
securities regulation.62 Although this holding is not directly relevant to the
issue in the Cendant cases, the Court’s reasoning in Daniel is the progenitor
of the Cendant Court’s holding that employees do not “purchase” stock
options from their employer. For this reason, it is the appropriate place to
begin the analysis.
A. THE DEFINITION OF A “SECURITY” AND THE DANIEL CASE
The prototypical plaintiff in a securities fraud case is the public investor
who buys stock through a regulated exchange. Of course, federal securities
regulation is not limited to such cases—an investor in leasehold interests for
a potential oil field,63 a holder of demand notes issued by an agricultural
cooperative,64 and even a business that purchases another business65 have all
been protected under federal securities laws. As the Court stated in Landreth
Timber Co. v. Landreth, “we cannot agree . . . that the Acts were intended to
59. Wyatt v. Cendant Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 550, 552–53 (D.N.J. 2000); McLaughlin v.
Cendant Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 539, 542 (D.N.J. 1999).
60. Wyatt, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 555–56; McLaughlin, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 544.
61. Wyatt, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 558; McLaughlin, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 545.
62. 439 U.S. 551, 570 (1979).
63. See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 345 (1943).
64. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
65. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
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cover only ‘passive investors.’”66 The Securities Acts both provide broad
definitions of the term “security.” Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act defines
security, in part, to include any “stock,” “transferable share,” “investment
contract,” or “any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.”67 The 1934 Act uses similar
language.68
The Court addressed the question of whether an employer’s pension
plan constituted a “security” under the Acts in International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Daniel.69 For a case that turns on the workings of such a plan, the
Court provided little analysis of the actual plan at issue. Pension plans are
generally categorized as “defined benefit” or “defined contribution” plans,
based on their method of asset allocation. A defined benefit plan is a plan
that provides its members with a predetermined award of benefits upon
retirement. A defined contribution plan is one in which the employer makes
a predetermined amount of contributions into a fund on behalf of
employees; upon retirement, employees receive benefits based on how
much money those contributions have earned.70 Although the Court’s
opinion provides little detail about the pension plan at issue in its opinion,
the plan appears to have been a defined benefit plan.71 The Court did take
pains, however, to emphasize two other aspects of the plan: that it was
“compulsory,” in that all employees were enrolled in the plan under the
collective-bargaining agreement, and that it was “noncontributory,” in that
the employer, and not the employees, paid money into the plan.72 Members
of the plan received a set monthly stipend upon retirement, which was
larger for those employees who retired later.73 Twenty years of continuous
service were required to be eligible for a pension.74
The plaintiff in Daniel, a truck driver who was disqualified from the plan
66. Id. at 692.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (2000).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2000). In Landreth, the Court held that the definitions of
“security” used in both Acts “are virtually identical and will be treated as such in our decisions
dealing with the scope of the term.” Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686 n.1.
69. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
70. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 414(i)–(j) (2000). A 401(k) plan is a type of defined contribution
plan.
71. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 553–54. Some of the aspects of the plan were similar to a defined
contribution plan, in that employers were required to put a certain amount into the fund per
employee. However, upon retirement employees received a predetermined monthly stipend,
the hallmark of a defined benefit plan. See id. at 554. In addition, the employer contributed to
the fund based on the number of employee man-weeks worked; it did not contribute on behalf
of particular employees. See id. at 560–61.
72. Id. at 553.
73. Id. at 554.
74. Id.
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for an alleged break in service, brought suit under the securities laws,
including Rule 10b-5, alleging misrepresentations and omissions on the part
of the plan’s trustees.75 Holding that the pension plan was not a security for
purposes of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the Court first noted that neither
statutory definition of “security” listed the term “pension plan” within it.
Plaintiff contended that the plan constituted an “investment contract,” a
grab-bag term included within the definitions.76 In the 1946 case, SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co.,77 the Court had set forth a working definition of the term
“investment contract” to determine whether a particular investment interest
should be treated as a security. According to Howey, “the test [for an
investment contract] is whether the scheme involves an investment of money
in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of
others.”78 Looking to the first “prong” of the test—“an investment of
money”—the Daniel Court found that the employees covered under the plan
had not made an investment of money into the fund.79 Plaintiff argued that
he had invested in the fund “[b]y allowing his employer to pay money into
the Fund, and by contributing his labor to his employer in return for these
payments.”80 The Court found, however, that “[o]nly in the most abstract
sense may it be said that an employee ‘exchanges’ some portion of his labor
in return for these possible benefits.”81 Comparing plaintiff to other
purchasers of securities, the Court found that in every other case, the
purchaser had given up “some tangible and definable consideration” in
return for the security.82 In plaintiff’s case, however, “the purported
investment is a relatively insignificant part of an employee’s total and
indivisible compensation package.”83 The Court was unwilling to look at the
pension plan as a separate and discrete security; instead, the Court
determined that an employee covered by the plan “surrenders his labor as a
whole, and in return receives a compensation package that is substantially
devoid of aspects resembling a security.”84 Having thus cabined the analysis,
the outcome is foreordained: “Looking at the economic realities, it seems
clear that an employee is selling his labor primarily to obtain a livelihood,
not making an investment.”85
75. Id. at 554–55.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2000).
77. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
78. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301, quoted in Daniel, 439 U.S. at 558.
79. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 559.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 560.
82. Id. (citing cases that involved money paid for bank capital stock; money paid for
purchase, maintenance, and harvesting of orange grove; money paid for land and oil
exploration; portion of premium paid for variable component of mixed annuity; and premium
paid for variable annuity contract).
83. Id.
84. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979).
85. Id.
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The Daniel Court also found that the plaintiff could not meet the
second part of the test, as the pension plan obtained its funds primarily
through employer contributions.86 Since profits from the investment of
those funds only constituted a small slice of the fund’s assets, the Court
concluded that the fund was not a “common enterprise with profits to come
solely from the efforts of others.”87 Moreover, the Court noted that an
employee’s benefits were not affected by the financial success of the fund,
but rather by the employee’s age at retirement. As the Court noted, “even if
it were proper to describe the benefits as a ‘profit’ returned on some
hypothetical investment by the employee, this profit would depend primarily
on the employee’s efforts to meet the vesting requirements, rather than the
fund’s investment success.”88 Since employees would not profit (or lose)
from the investment choices of the fund, the plan failed to meet the second
part of the Howey test. In further defense of its decision, the Court also
analyzed the legislative history of the Acts, as well as SEC past practice, and
found that neither contradicted its holding.89 Finally, the Court found that
the enactment of ERISA, which specifically regulated pension plans,
undercut the rationale for securities regulation of those plans.90 “Whatever
benefits employees might derive from the effect of the Securities Acts are
now provided in more definite form through ERISA.”91
Despite the variety of arguments the Daniel Court employed in its
decision, the Court characterized the primary issue as “whether a
noncontributory, compulsory pension plan constitutes a ‘security’,”92 and
framed its holding in similar language.93 By centering the case on whether a
plan was compulsory or noncontributory, the court focused on the first
prong of the Howey test—namely, that the employee had not made an
“investment of money” in the plan. This focus was not lost on those who
subsequently interpreted Daniel. As an amicus curiae in Daniel, the SEC had
argued that pension plans should be considered securities under the Acts, as
per its own past practice.94 However, after the Daniel decision the agency
issued a release setting forth its revised opinion as to the coverage of
employee benefit plans by the Acts.95 In that release, the SEC described the
Daniel holding as follows:
86. Id. at 562.
87. Id. at 558 (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946)).
88. Id. at 562.
89. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 563–69.
90. Id. at 569–70.
91. Id. at 570.
92. Id. at 553.
93. Id. at 570 (“We hold that the Securities Acts do not apply to a noncontributory,
compulsory pension plan.”).
94. Id. at 565–66.
95. Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 6188 (Feb. 1, 1980), 1980 WL 29482.
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The Daniel decision dealt with an involuntary, noncontributory
plan which was also a defined benefit plan. The Supreme Court’s
opinion in that case, however, did not rest on the fact that the plan
was a defined benefit one. Instead, the Court based its decision on
the involuntary nature of the plan (unlike all prior cases of the
Court involving securities, the employees did not have a choice
whether to participate) and the fact that the plan did not provide
for direct, identifiable contributions by employees (the employees’
labor could be considered a contribution “only in the most abstract
sense”). This view is supported both by the Court’s statement of the
issue presented by the case (“whether a noncontributory,
compulsory pension plan constitutes a ‘security’”) and by its later
statement that “We hold the Securities Acts do not apply to a
noncontributory, compulsory pension plan.” In neither instance
did the Court refer to the defined benefit nature of the plan.96
The SEC went on to state that it would only consider voluntary,
contributory pension plans to be “securities” under the Act. Plans to which
the employees contributed “involuntarily” were not securities, since Daniel
had noted that unlike other securities purchasers, employees had not
“chose[n] to give up specific consideration.”97 Plans in which the employees
chose to participate, but which were funded by employer contributions, were
also not securities, as the employees had not made an “investment of
money.”98
Reading between the lines, it seems clear that the SEC was following the
logic of Daniel to its absurd conclusion. The SEC’s initial distinction between
defined benefit and defined contribution plans seems a much more logical
way to exclude pension plans like the one in Daniel from securities
regulation. In a defined benefit plan, the employee does not risk anything,
as the employer is required to pay a certain amount to the employee during
retirement. Rather than an investment, a defined-benefit pension plan is a
method of deferring compensation. Defined contribution plans, on the
other hand, are an investment, as the employee is risking the money that the
employer has invested on her behalf.99 Using the Howey test, defined-benefit
96. Id. at *7.
97. Id. at *8.
98. Id.
99. See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive
Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1112–13 (1988) (noting that “[d]efined contribution and
defined benefit plans allocate investment risk oppositely,” with employers bearing the risk
under defined benefit plans and employees bearing the risk under defined contribution plans).
Interestingly, Fischel and Langbein note that multiemployer plans, like the one in Daniel, are
defined benefit plans from the employee’s perspective, but defined contribution plans from the
employer’s perspective. Under such plans, it is up to the plan’s trustee to adjust employer
contributions so as to provide the defined benefits. See id. at 1113.
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plans fail the test based on the second prong, as the benefits employees
receive are unaffected by the “profits” that the fund may generate.100 Instead
of following this analysis, however, the Court in Daniel emphasized that the
employees had not invested their “own” money and had no “choice” as to
what to do with the money that was invested, both factors which relate to the
“investment of money” prong. This choice has led to a variety of confused
distinctions when applied to employee investments. This confusion is
perhaps best illustrated by a discussion of how courts have treated employee
stock ownership plans.
B. DANIEL’S REACH: EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS AS SECURITIES
The use of the “involuntary” and “noncontributory” factors by the
Daniel Court, subsequently followed by the SEC, has led to considerable
confusion among the lower courts as to whether employee stock ownership
plans, or ESOPs, should be considered “securities.” Summarized briefly, an
ESOP is a fund which invests in the securities of a particular employer. Set
up by the employer, the ESOP often begins by borrowing money in order to
purchase a stake in the employer’s stock.101 The ESOP then transfers this
stock to the lender and pays off the loan over time, using contributions from
the employer. As the loan is paid off, the lender releases the shares back to
the ESOP. The ESOP then may allocate the shares to the accounts of
particular employees, who can then either receive shares of the stock
directly or receive the market value in cash once their interest in the ESOP
has vested.102 When established in this fashion, ESOPs are given substantial
benefits under the tax code.103
ESOPs are clearly defined contribution plans, as employers simply
provide set contributions to the plan, and employees receive shares of the
employer’s stock.104 Moreover, since employees are investing in an
employer’s stock through an ESOP, it seems clear that this investment
100. See Sean S. Hogle, Note, The Employee as Investor: The Case for Universal Application of the
Federal Securities Laws to Employee Stock Ownership Plans, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 205–06
(1992).
101. ESOPs that borrow money to purchase employer securities are known as leveraged
ESOPs. The ability to borrow money is one aspect that distinguishes ESOPs from other
retirement plans. See Alan Hyde & Craig Harnett Livingston, Employee Takeovers, 41 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1131, 1141–44 (1989) (discussing the advantages of borrowing through an ESOP).
102. Employees must be given the choice of receiving the benefits in cash or receiving the
stock directly in order for the ESOP to be qualified for benefits under the Internal Revenue
Code. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 409(h), 4975(e)(7) (2000).
103. See id. §§ 401, 4975(e)(7) (establishing such plans as “defined contribution plans” and
thereby “qualified trusts” entitled to the tax benefits afforded to qualified pension plans).
104. See Hogle, supra note 100, at 211 (“Unlike defined benefit plans, in which investment
performance has little or no effect upon the amount of the benefit to be paid, the entire risk of
the [ESOP] plan falls on employee participants.”).
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should constitute a security under the Acts.105 However, courts have split
over whether ESOPs constitute securities, mainly due to conflicts over the
application of Daniel’s “compulsory, noncontributory” analysis. Courts have
characterized ESOPs with similar characteristics—in one situation, the very
same plan106—as both voluntary and involuntary, and both contributory and
non-contributory.
Two district courts have found employee interest in ESOPs not to be
securities. In Childers v. Northwest Airlines,107 Republic Airlines negotiated with
unions representing its employees for a fifteen percent wage cut in
exchange for participation in an ESOP. Considering a subsequent suit by
employees raising a Rule 10b-5 claim, the court held that the ESOP was not
a security under the Acts. The court found that the plan was compulsory, as
all employees were bound by the collective bargaining agreement to
participate in the plan and thereby made no “individual affirmative
decision” to join the ESOP.108 Likewise, in Bauman v. Bish,109 an ESOP which
formed part of a proposed employee buy-out plan was also found to be
noncontributory and involuntary, despite the need for union approval of a
thirty-two percent wage reduction.110 In contrast, three courts have held that
ESOPs do represent securities. In Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight,
Inc.,111 the Tenth Circuit found the ESOP at issue to be both voluntary and
contributory. The court found that employees contributed to the plan by
forfeiting seventeen percent of their wages through a collective-bargaining
agreement similar to the agreement in Childers.112 Unlike the agreement in
Childers, however, employees had the option of participating in the ESOP;
they could also choose not to participate and continue to receive their
105. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) (noting that traditional
stock represents to many “the paradigm of a security”).
106. Compare Childers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Minn. 1988)
(finding that Republic Airlines ESOP is not a security), with Harris v. Republic Airlines, Inc.,
[1987–1988 Transder Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 93,772 (D.D.C. May 19, 1988), 1988
WL 56256 (finding that Republic Airlines ESOP is a security).
107. Childers, 688 F. Supp. at 1357.
108. Id. at 1363. The court also found no “common venture premised on a reasonable
expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.”
Id. (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 561 (1979)). According to the
court, “any appreciation in the value of the stock would not be attributable to the management
of the ESOPs but to the financial recovery of Republic as a whole.” Childers, 688 F. Supp. at
1363.
109. 571 F. Supp. 1054 (N.D. W. Va. 1983).
110. Id. at 1063. The court did not base its decision on this finding, but instead concluded
that no offer, sale, or purchase of securities had taken place. See id. at 1063–64.
111. 940 F.2d 564 (10th Cir. 1991).
112. See id. at 575 (“The economic reality of the transaction, therefore, was that plaintiffs
contributed their legal right to a portion of their wages to [the employer] in return for the
right to acquire [the employer’s] stock via the [employer’s] ESOP and to participate in [the
employer’s] profit-sharing plan.”).
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current wages.113 The ESOP in Hood v. Smith’s Transfer Corp.114 also allowed
employees to choose whether to participate; it also was found to be a
voluntary and contributory plan, based on the fifteen-percent wage
reduction that was required for participation.115 In Harris v. Republic Airlines,
Inc.,116 the court only notes that the employees “agreed to participate in” the
ESOP without explaining how.117 However, it too found that the employees’
agreement to continued wage reductions constituted contributions by
employees sufficient to make the ESOP a security.118
Since Daniel applied its “compulsory and noncontributory” test in the
context of whether a pension plan was an “investment contract” under the
Acts, it may seem logical to distinguish ESOPs based on the fact that ESOP
participants eventually receive stock, while the Daniel pension plan
participants receive a fixed amount of money.119 However, ESOP
participants do not receive stock directly from the company; instead, the
stock is sold to the ESOP. Only later, generally after vesting requirements
have been met, is the stock distributed to employee accounts. Upon vesting,
an employee can often request the cash value of the stock, rather than the
stock itself. Thus, just as an interest in a pension plan with stock holdings is
analyzed under the “investment contract” test, rather than being seen as a
“stock,” an employee’s interest in an ESOP may also be deemed sufficiently
removed from the stock itself to warrant analysis solely as an investment
contract.120 As the court noted in Harris, however, “[t]he introduction of an
ESOP as a device for distributing [the company’s] stock in accordance with
employee’s investments (presumably to take advantage of favorable tax
113. See id.
114. 762 F. Supp. 1274 (W.D. Ky. 1991).
115. Id. at 1290–91. While finding the plan to be voluntary and contributory, the court also
claimed that the Howey “investment contract” analysis was inapplicable, as participants in the
ESOP acquired shares of common stock.
116. [1987–1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 93,772 (D.D.C. May 19,
1988), 1988 WL 56256.
117. Id., 1988 WL 56256, at *4.
118. Id., 1988 WL 56256, at *9–*10. Interestingly, no court has found that an ESOP was
voluntary but noncontributory, or contributory but involuntary.
119. The courts in Hood and Harris both took this approach. See Hood, 762 F. Supp. at 1290–
91 (arguing that the ESOP was not a pension plan but instead a method of delivering shares in
the company to employees); Harris, 1988 WL 56256, at *8, *10 (same); see also Foltz v. U.S. News
& World Report, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1143, 1159 (D.D.C. 1986) (concluding that a stock bonus
plan represented either “stock” or “voting–trust certificates” and thus was a security).
120. Neither Uselton nor Bauman explained why they chose to use the “investment contract”
analysis, rather than the “stock” analysis used in Hood and Harris. See Uselton v. Commercial
Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 572 (10th Cir. 1991); Bauman v. Bush, 571 F. Supp.
1054, 1063 (N.D. W. Va. 1983). Bauman recognized, however, that ESOPs are different than
standard pension plans and thus did not view Daniel as dispositive. Id. In Childers, the plaintiffs
did not argue that they had purchased a security simply because the ESOPs were funded by
shares of stock, and thus the court did not address this issue. See Childers v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1357, 1363 n.5 (D. Minn. 1998).
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provisions), cannot and simply does not change the fundamentals of the
underlying transaction”121—namely, the distribution of employer stock to
employees.
C. EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS AS SECURITIES
Employees holding stock options can only sue under Rule 10b-5 if such
options are deemed to be “securities” for purposes of the Acts. Thus far,
courts have held that employee stock options are securities.122 Stock options
are enumerated in the text of the definition of a “security”: the definition
lists “stock” as well as “the right to . . . purchase any of the foregoing”
explicitly, thus including the right to purchase stock.123 As long as the stock
that is the subject of the option possesses “some of the significant
characteristics typically associated with stock,”124 the stock option meets the
definition of a security under the Acts. The confusion generated from the
Daniel analysis has not been a factor, since a direct grant of options would
obviate the need for an “investment contract” analysis when considering a
stock option plan.125
Courts have considered and rejected a potential argument for
excluding employee ownership interests from the definition of a “security”:
namely, that these interests are not securities because the “context otherwise
requires.” The definitional sections for the 1933 and 1934 Acts begin with
similar provisos—“[w]hen used in this subchapter, unless the context
otherwise requires . . . .”126 Courts and commentators have debated over the
exact meaning of this exception, particularly whether “context” means “in
the context of the statute’s text,” or “in the context of the facts of the
case.”127 In two Rule 10b-5 cases involving employee ownership interests—
121. Harris, 1988 WL 56256, at *10.
122. See, e.g., Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition Inst., Inc., 751 F.2d 555, 559 (2d Cir.
1985); McLaughlin v. Cendant Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 539, 545 (D.N.J. 1999); Collins v. Rukin,
342 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (D. Mass. 1972).
123. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(1), 78c(a)(10) (2000).
124. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985).
125. In Landreth, the Court made clear that the Howey economic realities test, which Daniel
was applying in developing its “involuntary and noncontributory” analysis, should be used only
when determining whether a particular instrument is an investment contract. See Landreth, 471
U.S. at 691–92. However, one might imagine that if a stock option plan were created with an
intermediary step in which the options were distributed to a plan and then, after vesting, to
employees, that middle step could turn a stock option plan into the equivalent of an ESOP
using options. A court might then apply the Daniel “investment contract” analysis to the plan. If
an employer set up a stock option plan without explicit bargaining by employees such that
there was no explicit “contribution” by employees to the plan, and employees had no “choice”
as to whether to join the plan or not, the plan would fail Daniel’s requirement that such plans
be voluntary and contributory. This possibility is, however, purely hypothetical.
126. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2000); see also id. § 78(c) (“When used in this chapter, unless the
context otherwise requires . . . .”).
127. See. e.g., Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 429–31 (1981); Superintendent of Ins. v.
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one involving stock, the other stock options—defendants argued that the
securities laws should not apply in the “context” of securities that form part
of an employment contract.128 In both cases, while the courts noted that the
securities laws were designed to protect investors, they nevertheless found
the securities protections broad enough to encompass employees with
interests in their companies.129 As Judge Friendly wrote in the Yoder case,
“We see no reason why ‘the context requires’ us to hold that an individual
who commits herself to employment by a corporation in return for stock or
the promise of stock should not be considered an investor.”130
D. EMPLOYEES AS PURCHASERS OF SECURITIES
While courts have held that employee stock options are covered as
securities under the Acts, employees must overcome another threshold to
meet the requirements of Rule 10b-5. As discussed above,131 only actual
purchasers and sellers of securities can bring private actions under Rule 10b-
5. Moreover, the fraud or misrepresentation in an action must be connected
to the actual sale or purchase by which the plaintiff became a “purchaser” or
“seller.”132 Section 2(3) of the 1933 Act defines “sale” and “sell” to “include
every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for
value,”133 while section 3(a)(14) of the 1934 Act defines these terms to
“include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of.”134 The question at
issue, then, is whether an employee’s receipt of an opportunity for
ownership in his or her company through means of an ESOP, stock
purchase plan, or stock options, is a “sale” of securities by the employer.
In its 1980 release on employee benefit plans, the SEC found that
generally no sale takes place when employees acquire ownership interests
through stock bonus plans.135 Defining a stock bonus plan as a plan “under
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10–12 (1971); SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466
(1969); 2 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 873–74 (3d ed. 1989); Marc I.
Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition of “Security”: The “Context”
Clause, “Investment Contract” Analysis, and Their Ramifications, 40 VAND. L. REV. 489, 504 (1987).
128. See Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition Inst., Inc., 751 F.2d 555, 559 (2d Cir. 1985);
Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (D. Mass. 1972).
129. See Yoder, 751 F.2d at 560–61; Collins, 342 F. Supp. at 1286.
130. Yoder, 751 F.2d at 560.
131. See supra Section II.
132. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (2000).
134. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (2000). Section 3(a)(13) defines “buy” and “purchase” to
“include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire.” Id. § 78c(a)(13). Courts have
held that the definitions of “sale” in the two Acts, despite their differences in wording, should
be construed similarly. See Lawrence v. SEC, 398 F.2d 276, 280 (1st Cir. 1968), quoted in Collins,
342 F. Supp. at 1288 n.12.
135. Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 6188 (Feb. 1, 1980), 1980 WL 29482. Examples of
such stock bonus plans include ESOPs, Tax Reduction Act Stock Ownership Plans (TRASOPs),
and stock appreciation right plans (SARs). See id.
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which an employer awards shares of its stock to covered employees at no
direct cost to the employee,” the SEC found that such awards are not sales
because employees “do not individually bargain to contribute cash or other
tangible or definable consideration to such plans.”136 Interestingly, the
agency makes an exception in a footnote:
The staff’s position generally is applicable only in the context of
bonus plans which are made available to a relatively broad class of
employees. With respect to stock awarded to, or acquired by,
employees pursuant to individual employment arrangements, the
staff generally has concluded that such arrangements involve
separately bargained consideration, and that a sale of the stock has
occurred.137
Thus, the SEC makes a fundamental distinction: if the plan awards stock
to a large percentage of employees, no sale has occurred, but if select
employees receive stock on an individual basis, a sale has taken place.
This distinction is on display in a collection of SEC no-action letters
concerning large-scale employee stock bonus plans created by European
companies.138 In Europe, the companies had structured these plans so that
employees could purchase company stock at a discount only with money
they had saved through an employer savings plan. Since such a transaction
would clearly be a sale of the stock, the companies altered the plans for U.S.
consumption by giving shares to employees merely for saving a certain
amount of money. For example, in the Thorn EMI no-action letter,139 counsel
for Thorn EMI set forth a plan in which employees would be required to
save money in a savings account for one year. At the end of the year, the
employee would be awarded a number of shares based on the amount the
employee invested, as well as the stock’s appreciation over the previous
year.140 Since employees made no “payment” for their stock award, other
than keeping money in an interest-bearing account for a year, the SEC
determined that “the employee bonus share plan involve[d] no offers or
136. Id.
137. Id. at *15 n.84.
138. “No-action” letters are prepared by SEC staff in response to letters from private
attorneys regarding a proposed course of action. If a staff member agrees that the proposed
action is in compliance with the law, she will compose a response stating that the staff will
recommend to the Commission that no enforcement action be taken. These “no-action” letters
are made public by the SEC and offer important guidance to practitioners. However, they are
not binding on the five-member Commission, and the staff is free to change its position in the
future. See RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 103
(8th ed. 1998).
139. Thorn EMI PLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 56547 (Mar. 18, 1992).
140. See id. at *2. If the employee was forced to leave employment under certain
“compassionate” circumstances prior to the end of the year, she would be entitled to partial
vesting of the shares. See id. at *3.
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sales of securities.”141 Similar plans have also received no-action letters.142 All
these plans were available to a broad class of employees.143
In determining whether an employer’s distribution of stock or stock
options is a sale for the purposes of Rule 10b-5, courts have largely followed
the division set forth by the SEC. In cases involving individually negotiated
stock or stock options, courts have found that the negotiation of those
securities constitutes a sale. In Collins v. Rukin,144 the court puzzled over
whether the “absence of cash consideration flowing from [employee to
employer]” with regard to a stock option plan disqualified the offering of
those options from being considered a sale.145 The plaintiff in Collins had
been working at Magnavox as an electrical engineer when he was wooed to
join the defendant employer by defendant, the employer’s president and
majority shareholder.146 Part of the compensation plan offered to plaintiff
was a stock options agreement.147 Finding a lack of precedent as to whether
“plaintiff’s acceptance of employment with [employer] and his subsequent
performance of services as an electrical engineer and executive officer
qualifies as value,” the court noted defendants’ analogy of its stock option
plan to other “bonus” plans which gave employees profits or stock without
the need for consideration.148 The court distinguished the plan in Collins
from such bonus plans, however, by noting that the option plan was not
given gratuitously, but rather was “a quid pro quo offered to induce plaintiff
to enter into the employ of [defendant].”149 The court concluded that the
plaintiff’s performance of services satisfied the requirement in section 2(3)
141. Id. at *7.
142. See Compass Group PLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 311797 (May 13, 1999);
Guinness PLC, SEC No-Action Letter, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 76,672
(Apr. 9, 1993), 1993 WL 113137; Fisons PLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 286992 (Oct. 22,
1990). In all of these cases, the letters sought to avoid registering the securities under section
2(3) of the 1933 Act.
143. See Compass Group No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 311797 at *1 (stating that all non-union
employees with at least six months of service may participate in the plan); Guiness No-Action
Letter, 1993 WL 113137 at *2 (stating that all employees of the Guiness joint venture with
several other European companies may participate in the plan); Thorn EMI No-Action Letter,
1992 WL 56547 at *1–*2 (stating that all employees (including 10,200 in the U.S.) may
participate in the plan); Fisons No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 286992 at *2 (noting that all U.S.
employees may participate in the plan).
144. 342 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Mass. 1972).
145. Id. at 1289.
146. Id. at 1284.
147. The stock options offered under the plan were personal and non-transferable, and
therefore non-negotiable. See id. at 1286. However, the employer falsely suggested that the
company was about to “go public,” thus making its stock more valuable. Id. at 1284.
148. Id. at 1289.
149. Collins, 342 F. Supp. at 1289.
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of the 1933 Act that the sale be made “for value,” and therefore found that a
sale had taken place.150
In Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition Institute, Inc.,151 plaintiff was a
specialist in the field of food allergies who reached an agreement to sell her
business to defendant. As part of the agreement, plaintiff became
defendant’s employee, and defendant agreed to issue shares in itself to
plaintiff if a certain amount of sales were generated.152 The Second Circuit,
in an opinion authored by Judge Friendly, held that this agreement
constituted a sale of securities.153 Citing to Collins, the court noted that
“[l]ike Ms. Yoder, the plaintiff [in Collins] alleged that he was induced to
accept employment with the defendant at least partly on the basis of the
latter’s promises of stock and stock options.”154 Other courts, in turn, have
cited to Yoder for the proposition that “[a]n agreement exchanging a
plaintiff’s services for a defendant corporation’s stock constitutes a ‘sale’
under the terms of the Securities Exchange Act.”155 These courts have all
found securities sales in contexts similar to Collins and Yoder. In Rudinger, the
plaintiff became defendant employer’s president and chief operating officer
150. Id. at 1290 (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (2000)).
151. 751 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1985).
152. See id. at 556–57.
153. Id. at 560.
154. Id. (citing Collins, 342 F. Supp. at 1287–88). Yoder involved much more than an
employment contract, as the assets of Ms. Yoder’s business were also part of the sale. The court
noted:
[T]his case does not require us to hold that an action under Rule 10b-5 can be
maintained . . . where the plaintiff merely promises to work for a defendant in
return for the latter’s promise to issue stock, whether with or without the payment
of salary—although, as developed above, we see little reason for not holding to that
effect.
Id. at 561.
155. Rudinger v. Ins. Data Processing, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 1334, 1338–39 (E.D. Pa. 1991); see
also Campbell v. Nat’l Media Corp., [1994–1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
98,449 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 1994) (“An employment contract whereby an employee exchanges his
services in return for stock options has been held to constitute a purchase with the meaning of
the 1934 Act.”); Sanzone v. Phoenix Technologies, Inc., No. Civ. A. 89-5397, 1990 WL 50732, at
*14 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 1990) (“[I]f established at trial, the purported agreement exchanging
plaintiff’s services as an employee for defendant corporation’s stock constitutes a ‘sale’ under
the terms of the Securities Exchange Act.”); Dubin v. E.F. Hutton Group Inc., 695 F. Supp. 138,
145 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that plaintiff who accepted employment in exchange for equity
interest, “like the plaintiffs in Yoder and Collins, made a decision like that of an ‘investor,’ who
must be able to depend on the representations made by the transferor of any securities”). Even
the court in McLaughlin v. Cendant Corp. cites Yoder for this proposition. See McLaughlin v.
Cendant Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 539, 544 (D.N.J. 1999) (“When an individual ‘commits herself to
employment by a corporation in return for stock or the promise of stock,’ she will be
considered an investor worthy of protection under the federal securities laws.” (quoting Yoder,
751 F.2d at 560)).
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after signing an agreement that included a promise of stock options.156 In
Campbell, the defendant employer executed an employment agreement with
plaintiff, its corporate secretary and vice-president for investor relations,
which included stock options.157 The plaintiff in Sanzone allegedly accepted
employment as defendant employer’s vice-president of manufacturing after
negotiating for salary, benefits, and five percent of the employer’s stock.158
Similarly, in Dubin the plaintiff joined defendant employer to oversee its
public power and resource recovery group after negotiating for participation
in the employer’s equity ownership plan.159 In all of these cases, plaintiffs
were high-level executives or managers with individual agreements for stock
or stock option plans; in all but one, the plaintiff had agreed to join the
defendant as an employee pursuant to the agreement.160
In contrast, for those cases in which employer securities were offered to
employees as a group, courts have largely held that no “sale” has taken place.
As discussed earlier, Bauman v. Bish161 involved an ESOP which formed part
of a proposed employee buy-out plan; under the plan, employees would take
a thirty-two percent wage cut in exchange for control of a newly-formed
company through the ESOP.162 The court held that, if executed, the
creation of the ESOP would not constitute a “sale” under the Acts, as there
was no furnishing of “value” by participating employees.163 According to the
court, “[t]he notion that the exchange of labor will suffice to constitute the
type of investment which the Securities Acts were intended to regulate was
rejected in Daniel.”164 Plaintiffs contended that the employees’ reduction in
wages in exchange for the ESOP constituted “value” or consideration under
the Acts. Calling this a “strained interpretation” of the facts, the court found
that “the proposed ESOP is a method of deferring income, not reducing
wages or paying for stock.”165
In two recent cases involving the Cendant Corporation, employees who
had received stock options through a company-wide plan were held not to
have participated in a “sale” of those options, and therefore could not bring
156. See Rudinger, 778 F. Supp. at 1336.
157. See Campbell, 1994 WL 612807, at *1.
158. See Sanzone, 1990 WL 50732, at *1.
159. See Dubin, 695 F. Supp. at 140–41.
160. In Campbell, the plaintiff was already an employee when he executed the agreement.
See Campbell, 1994 WL 612807, at *1.
161. 571 F. Supp. 1054 (N.D. W. Va. 1983).
162. Id. at 1057.
163. See id. at 1063–64.
164. Id. (citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559–61 (1979)).
165. Id. (citing AM. JUR. 2D., PENSION REFORM ACT § 187 (1975)); see also Childers v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1357, 1363 (D. Minn. 1988) (finding that wage
concessions were “a method of deferring income, not a method of reducing wages to pay for
stock”).
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Rule 10b-5 claims. In the first case, McLaughlin v. Cendant Corp.,166 plaintiff
Eileen McLaughlin was a former Cendant employee who had received
66,863 stock options through an employee stock option plan.167 While these
options were apparently not individually negotiated, the plaintiff did allege
that they had been provided as “an incentive to key employees of the
Company and . . . to offer an additional inducement in obtaining the
services of such individuals.”168 The New Jersey district court recognized that,
in cases where employer securities are specifically bargained for, the
agreement to provide those securities does constitute a sale under the
Acts.169 However, the court noted that the plaintiff “acquired her options
when she was already employed by Cendant under a plan that offered the
options not to her as an individual, but as a member of an employee
group.”170 Citing to SEC Release No. 33-6188 as well as a prior no-action
letter, the court noted the SEC’s position that stock bonus plans do not
constitute a purchase or sale when employees have not given anything of
value other than continued employment.171 The court, citing to Daniel and
Bauman, then said that other courts had found no sale had taken place when
a plan was compulsory and non-contributory.172 Holding that courts had
rejected continued labor as a “contribution,” the court held that Cendant’s
stock option plan was compulsory, as employees had no option other than to
refuse the plan, and non-contributory, as there had been no bargained-for
exchange of value.173 The court noted: “Though the plan stated that it was
created to provide an incentive for employees to remain with Cendant, that
language does not change the actual structure of the plan.”174
In Wyatt v. Cendant Corp., plaintiffs were management employees at
Interval International, a subsidiary of CUC International (one-half of the
eventual Cendant Corporation, after a merger with HFS, Inc.).175  In 1992,
CUC’s board of directors adopted a stock option plan for senior
166. 76 F. Supp. 2d 539 (D.N.J. 1999).
167. Id. at 541. Plaintiff also asserted that she purchased 7777 options for cash. Id. The
claims relating to these options were dismissed for failure to satisfy the heightened pleading
requirements for fraud in a Rule 10b-5 claim. See id. at 545–48.
168. Id. at 544 (quoting Plaintiff’s Brief at 17 (ellipsis in original)). The decision does not
specify McLaughlin’s position at Cendant.
169. See id.
170. Id.
171. See McLaughlin, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 544 (citing to Compass Group PLC, SEC No-Action
Letter, 1999 WL 311797 (May 13, 1999); Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 6188 (Feb. 1, 1980),
1980 WL 29482).
172. See id. at 544–45 (citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558–59 (1979);
Bauman v. Bish, 571 F. Supp. 1054, 1064 (N.D. W. Va. 1983)).
173. See id. at 545.
174. Id.
175. 81 F. Supp. 2d 550, 552 (D.N.J. 2000).
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management in which plaintiffs participated.176 Pursuant to merger
discussions with HFS, CUC decided to divest itself of Interval prior to the
merger.177 Under the terms of the stock option plan, plaintiffs would be
required to exercise their options within four months of the divestiture or
forfeit those options.178 However, working through Interval’s president,
plaintiffs managed to negotiate a two-year exercise period, as well as
accelerated vesting for their unvested options.179
In bringing a private action under Rule 10b-5, plaintiffs alleged that the
modifications to their option agreement that took place upon divestiture
constituted a “sale or purchase” of those options.180 Again, however, the
court found the stock option plan, even with the modifications, to be a
compulsory, noncontributory plan.181 First, the court noted that plaintiffs
had not altered their employment relations in any way that would provide
specific consideration for the sale.182 Since they had not made any concrete
changes to their employment relationship to “pay” for the options, the plan
remained noncontributory.183 And since the plaintiffs could have only
chosen to participate in the plan or reject it, the plan was compulsory in that
plaintiffs had not made a voluntary “investment decision” to participate.184
Plaintiffs maintained that their bargaining with CUC (through Interval’s
president) for better terms constituted a collective investment decision on
their part.185 However, the court held that “[t]he admittedly collective
bargaining here negates the existence of any individual, voluntary
investment decision.”186
Thus, when individual employees have bargained to receive employer
securities in return for employment, courts have generally found that such
agreements should be considered a “sale” for purposes of Rule 10b-5.
However, when employees receive employer securities as part of a group
plan, the transfer of securities through the plan will not be considered a
sale, unless employees give specific consideration and have a “choice” that
goes beyond simply accepting or rejecting the plan. This distinction
176. Id.
177. Id. at 552–53. The merger between CUC and HFS resulted in the creation of Cendant.
178. Id. at 553. Barring divestiture, the plan gave employees ten years to exercise the options.
179. Id.
180. Wyatt, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 555. Plaintiffs did not contend that the initial distribution of
options through the plan was a sale.
181. Id. at 556–58.
182. Id. at 556 (“Unlike Yoder and Rudinger, where the employee changed his employment
status in return for individually bargained-for compensation including stock options, the Wyatt
plaintiffs remained as at-will Interval employees with the same responsibilities and
compensation they had pre-divestiture.”).
183. Id. at 557.
184. Id. at 557–58.
185. Wyatt, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 558.
186. Id.
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obviously favors those employees who individually bargain for their
employment terms, and disadvantages those employees whose employment
terms are negotiated or dictated as a group. The former group is more likely
to be officers, executives, or other high-placed employees within a company,
while the latter group is likely to be lower-ranking employees. This
distinction is illustrated by the cases: the plaintiffs in Yoder, Collins, Rudlinger,
Dubin, Campbell, and Sanzone were all owners or executives, while the
plaintiffs in the Cendant cases were lower-ranking employees, and the
plaintiffs in Bauman were union-represented employees.187
Two unpublished district court decisions from the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania bucked this trend, but with little comment. Both cases concern
Rule 10b-5 claims brought by employees pursuant to participation in a
“Long-Term Incentive Plan” or LTIP, through which executives and “key
employees” were eligible for stock options.188 Although the employees
thereby received their options through a plan, the courts held that this
transfer was a sale for Rule 10b-5 purposes.189 Citing to Campbell, Rudinger,
and Sanzone, both cases held that the exchange of plaintiff’s services for
stock options constituted a sale.190 Neither case discussed the SEC Release
on the issue.
Ironically, a recent Ninth Circuit decision found that employees
received their stock options through a “sale”—but did so in order to dismiss
the employees’ claims.191 In Falkowski v. Imation Corp., the Ninth Circuit was
interpreting the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
(SLUSA), which preempts class actions involving allegations of fraud “in
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security” when such
actions are based on state law.192 The plaintiffs were employees who had
received stock options through a company plan.193 They brought a class
187. Of course, executives and other high-ranking employees may also receive their options
through a plan. The point here is a general one: low-level employees are unlikely to receive
their options through individual negotiations, and higher-level executives are more likely to get
such individualized attention.
188. See Feret v. CoreStates Fin. Corp., No. Civ. A. 97-6759, 1998 WL 426560, at *11 n.14
(E.D. Pa. July 27, 1998); Tafuri v. Air Prods. and Chems., Inc., No. Civ. A. 97-3413, 1997 WL
643598, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 1997).
189. See Feret, 1998 WL 426560, at *14; Tafuri, 1997 WL 643598, at *2.
190. See Feret, 1998 WL 426560, at *14; Tafuri, 1997 WL 643598, at *2.
191. Falkowski v. Imation Corp., 309 F.3d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir. 2002), amended, No. 01-
16113, 2003 WL 350840 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 2003) (amending the 2002 decision slightly without
changing the holding or reasoning).
192. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b)(1)–(2), 78bb(f)(1)–(2) (2000). The purpose of SLUSA was to
prevent plaintiffs from circumventing heightened pleading requirements for federal securities
class action by bring actions based on state law instead. See Falkowski, 309 F.3d at 1128.
193. More precisely, the employees had been working at another company (Cemax-Icon,
Inc.) until the company was acquired by the defendant Imation. The employees’ Cemax-Icon
stock options, which they had received through a company plan, were then converted to
Imation stock options. Falkowski, 309 F.3d at 1126–27.
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action suit raising California state law claims that  alleged that Imation had
misrepresented the underlying value of their options.194 Imation moved for
dismissal of the suit, arguing that the class action alleged “a
misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security,”195 and therefore was preempted by
SLUSA.196 The Ninth Circuit agreed that the action was preempted, as it
held that “[t]he grant of an employee stock option on a covered security
is . . . a ‘sale’ of that covered security.”197 In reaching this determination, the
court noted that the federal securities acts define the purchase or sale of a
security to include any contract to buy or sell a security.198 The court found
that since an option contract is a contract to sell a security, “that contract is a
‘sale’ even if the sale is never consummated.”199 The employees argued that
the grant of an employee stock option was not a sale because the only thing
given in return was continued employment and cited the Cendant cases and
the 1980 SEC Release.200 The Ninth Circuit distinguished the SEC Release by
arguing that “[u]nlike stock bonus plans, stock option plans involve
contracts to sell stock for money at a later date.”201 Therefore, because the
option itself was a “sale,” it did not matter whether the grant of the option
was a sale.202 Recognizing that the Cendant case also involved a stock option
plan, the Ninth Circuit simply noted its rejection of Cendant’s contrary
holding.203 By finding that the stock options were themselves a sale of a
covered security, the court thereby held that plaintiffs’ action was
preempted under SLUSA and ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs’ securities
fraud claims.204
While it may appear at first glance that Falkowski signals a rejection of
the Cendant distinction in the Ninth Circuit, the decision is in fact much less
positive for employees. First, the Falkowski court was interpreting SLUSA, not
Rule 10b-5, a point the court makes clear.205 Second, the court did not reject
the fundamental distinction made by the SEC in its 1980 release—namely,
the difference between a broad-based grant of employer securities and an
194. Id. at 1127.
195. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A) (2000).
196. Falkowski, 309 F.3d at 1128.
197. Id. at 1129–30.
198. Id. at 1129 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(3), 78c(a)(13)–(14) (2000)).
199. Id. The court described this result as “the aborted purchaser-seller doctrine.” Id.
(quoting Mosher v. Kane, 784 F.2d 1385, 1388–89 (9th Cir. 1986)).
200. Id. at 1130.
201. Falkowski, 309 F.3d at 1130. The court therefore held that “[e]ven assuming that
SLUSA contains a similar exemption [to the one discussed in the 1980 SEC Release], it is
inapplicable here.” Id.
202. See id. at 1129–30.
203. Id. at 1130.
204. See id. at 1131.
205. Id. at 1130.
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individually negotiated grant. Instead, the court held that this distinction
did not apply to stock option plans, because options themselves are a
“sale.”206 The SEC has nowhere supported such a distinction—indeed, the
only support the Falkowski court could find for its distinction were two Ninth
Circuit decisions from 1986 concerning the “aborted purchaser-seller
doctrine.”207 The anomalous result of the Falkowski logic, if ever extended to
Rule 10b-5, would be that employees could sue for fraud in connection with
an employee stock option plan, but not for fraud in connection with a plan
that directly gave stock to employees. In the meantime, however, the
distinction between group stock option plans and individually negotiated
option grants—a distinction dictated by the SEC as well as the Cendant
cases—still stands with regard to Rule 10b-5.
V. THE ILLOGIC OF THE CURRENT DISTINCTION
Is it good law, from both a doctrinal and a policy perspective, to include
employees who individually bargain for stock options within the ambit of
Rule 10b-5 while excluding those who receive them en masse? This issue is
discussed below, first as a matter of doctrine, and then as a matter of policy.
A. ISSUES OF DOCTRINE: “SALE” AS CONTRACT
The definitions for “sale” and “purchase” under the Securities Acts are
based on notions of contract. As noted earlier, Section 2(3) of the 1933 Act
defines “sale” and “sell” to “include every contract of sale or disposition of a
security or interest in a security, for value.”208 Section 3(a)(14) of the 1934
Act defines these terms to “include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose
of,” and defines “buy” and “purchase” to “include any contract to buy,
purchase, or otherwise acquire.”209 Interestingly, both definitions of “sale”
move beyond contracts “of sale” or contracts “to sell” to include other
“dispositions” for “value.” 210 The definition of sale could be read to require
206. Falkowski, 309 F.3d at 1130.
207. See id. at 1129 (citing Mosher v. Kane, 784 F.2d 1385, 1388–89 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled
on other grounds by In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349, 1352 (9th Cir.
1987), and Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 803 F.2d 1513, 1518 (9th Cir. 1986). Moreover,
the aborted purchaser-seller doctrine concerns situations where a contract for the sale of
securities was allegedly aborted as a result of fraud—not situations involving employee stock
options.
208. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (2000).
209. Id. § 78c(a)(13)–(14).
210. Since we are interpreting section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, arguably only the definition of
“sale” in section 3(a)(14) of that act is relevant to the inquiry. Cf. SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393
U.S. 453, 466 (1969) (noting that the meaning of “purchase or sale” may differ, even in
different provisions of the Securities Acts, based on the context). However, courts have noted
the similarities between the two provisions, particularly in the context of antifraud actions. See,
e.g., Lawrence v. SEC, 398 F.2d 276, 280 (1st Cir. 1968) (holding that the definitions of “sale” in
the two Acts should be construed similarly), quoted in Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282, 1288
n.12 (D. Mass. 1972).
BODIE_CONV 03/15/03 9:55 PM
EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS AND RULE 10B-5 569
that one party provide money in exchange for goods or services provided by
the other party.211 However, the 1933 Act defines “sale” and “sell” to include
any “disposition of a security . . . for value.”212 And the 1934 Act definition
includes any contract to sell or “otherwise dispose of.” Thus, any contract
through which a security (or an interest in a security) is transferred from
one party to another should suffice to constitute a “sale,” as long as the seller
“dispose[s] of” the stock.213
Courts have emphasized this broad definition of sale, particularly in the
context of Rule 10b-5. In SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,214 the Court held that
a shareholder vote approving a merger between two companies constituted a
“sale” for purposes of Rule 10b-5, based on “[t]he broad antifraud purposes
of . . . the rule.”215 The vote had wiped out the shareholders’ stock in the old
company and given them stock in the new company.216 The Court concluded
that the shareholders had “‘purchased’ shares in the new company by
exchanging them for their old stock,” and therefore met the section 10(b)
requirement of a “sale or purchase.”217 In SEC v. Continental Commodities
Corp.,218 the Fifth Circuit held that a sale had taken place when a company
issued notes to customers in exchange for the promise not to institute legal
proceedings based on a previous transaction.219 Similar to the transactions in
these other cases, the transfer of employer securities to employees would
appear to constitute a contract, whether done on an individual or group
basis. In both situations, the employer is providing the security in exchange
for “value”—namely, the employees’ continued labor.
The notion that employee benefits, such as pension plans or stock
options, are not bargained-for contracts but rather employer-provided
gratuities has its roots in early common law decisions about such benefits.
For example, in McNevin v. Solvay Process Co.,220 a New York state court
rejected plaintiff’s attempt to recover his share of a pension fund after he
left the employer. The court characterized the pension fund as a “voluntary”
211. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1085 (2d coll. ed. 1982) (defining “sale”
as “[t]he exchange of goods or services for an amount of money or its equivalent”); WEBSTER’S
NEW WORLD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 563 (1996) (defining “sell” as “to exchange (goods,
services, etc.) for money etc.”).
212. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (2000).
213. See SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 n.8 (1969) (noting that the statutory
definitions of “sale” and “purchase” “indicate the breadth of the statutory terms by using the
definitional word ‘include’ and by including within the definitions contracts ‘to buy, purchase,
or otherwise acquire’ and ‘to sell or otherwise dispose of’ securities”).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 467.
216. Id. at 455.
217. Id. at 467.
218. 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
219. Id. at 528.
220. 53 N.Y.S. 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898).
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creation of the employer that should be treated as an “inchoate gift” until
the money was actually given to the employee.221 According to the court,
“the scheme by which this fund is created is simply a promise on the part of
the defendant to give its employees a certain sum in the future with an
absolute reservation that it may at any time determine not to complete the
gift.”222 Noting that the defendant had nowhere reserved the right to rescind
the pension fund, the dissent took issue with this analysis: “A promise,
founded upon a valuable consideration . . . , to pay a sum of money upon
specified contingencies, is not a promise to make a gift . . . .”223 Nevertheless,
the “gratuity theory” of pension rights continued into the 1950s.224
Admittedly, the individually bargained-for stock option agreement is
closer to the Platonic ideal of a “contract” than a company-wide stock option
plan. Under the “bargain theory” of contracts, an agreement under which
only one side contributes consideration is not a legally-binding contract.225
An agreement which is not a “bargain”—namely, each party giving
something of value in exchange for something else of value—does not
deserve legal enforcement as a contract, as it is not generally a commercial
enterprise.226 In those cases in which an employee individually bargains for
some form of employer securities, the courts have taken pains to describe
the agreement as the result of negotiations between the two sides. For
example, in Collins v. Rukin, the court notes that the employer’s president
“invited plaintiff to leave California and to join [the employer] in
Massachusetts” and “offered plaintiff, in addition to salary, certain so-called
fringe benefits, one of which was an opportunity to purchase shares of stock
in [the employer].”227 In Dubin v. E.F. Hutton Group Inc., the court notes that
the employer’s executive vice president “contacted plaintiff by telephone to
solicit his interest in employment,” and later, “in order to persuade plaintiff
to join [the employer],” offered him a higher salary and bonus, as well as
10,000 shares of the employer’s stock.228 In Campbell v. National Media Corp., a
case concerning options which were given to a current employee, the court
makes sure to note that the plaintiff received his options “as compensation
for his work as corporate secretary and vice-president for investor
221. Id. at 99, 100.
222. Id. at 100.
223. Id. at 103 (Green, J., dissenting).
224. JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 127 (3d
ed. 2000).
225. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.2, at 43 (2d ed. 1990).
226. Id. § 2.2, at 44.
227. Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282, 1284 (D. Mass. 1972).
228. Dubin v. E.F. Hutton Group Inc., 695 F. Supp. 138, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also
Rudinger v. Ins. Data Processing, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 1334, 1336 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (noting that,
upon hiring, plaintiff signed an “employment contract” which included salary, bonus, and
participation in a stock option plan).
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relations.”229 By contrast, in the Cendant cases, where the court found no
sale, the court describes the transfer of options to employees almost as a gift.
In McLaughlin v. Cendant Corp., the court does not explain how the stock
option plan came into effect; it only notes that plaintiff “received” 66,863
options under her employee stock option plan.230 In Wyatt v. Cendant Corp.,
the court notes that the employer’s board of directors “adopted a stock
option plan for [its] employees.”231 There is no discussion of how or why
these stock option plans were created.232
Are stock option plans, when given to employees as a whole, a gift? If
these plans are created by an employer without any employee request or
negotiation, it may appear that they have been given without any exchange
of consideration by employees. After all, if employees are working for wage
X on Monday, and then are working for wage X plus stock options on
Tuesday, it would be hard to argue that the employees would not have
worked Tuesday had it not been for the stock options. Might an employer’s
stock option plan, if provided without consideration, be considered not a
contract, but instead evidence of the employer’s munificence?
The concept that an employer provides benefits out of its generosity
seems laughable today. It is doubtful that even the court in the Cendant cases
would find the stock option plans to be unenforceable contracts due to lack
of consideration. Even though a stock option plan that appears from the
mists may appear to be a unilateral gift, it is clear that the plan is part of the
overall consideration offered by an employer in return for the employees’
labor. Because the bargaining that takes place in the workplace is often not
overt, employment contracts may be difficult to pin down. They rely
generally on oral agreements and may consist of implied terms, oral
promises, and even consistent employer practices.233 Most courts have found
the employment at-will contract to be a unilateral one, in which the
employer offers a promise of compensation in exchange for performance by
the employee.234 However, it is generally recognized that an employee’s
continued labor in an at-will regime, given her freedom to quit and seek
employment elsewhere, is ample consideration for all express and implied
229. Campbell v. Nat’l Media Corp., [1994–1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 98,449 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 1994), 1994 WL 612807, at *1.
230. McLaughlin v. Cendant Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 539, 541 (D.N.J. 1999).
231. Wyatt v. Cendant Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 550, 552 (D.N.J. 2000).
232. The court in Childers, which found an ESOP not to be a security, said that the ESOP
had been formed “in an effort to improve [the company’s] weak financial position.” See
Childers v. Northwest Airlines, 688 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (D. Minn. 1988).
233. See Alan Hyde, Employment Contracts Implied in Fact, at http://andromeda.rutgers.edu
/~hyde/contract.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2003) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
234. See, e.g., Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1142–43 (Ariz. 1999); Pine River State
Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983); Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 491
A.2d 1257, 1267 (N.J. 1985).
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promises made by the employer.235 The only exception to this rule has been
the requirement of additional consideration for certain job security
provisions, such as permanent employment.236 This exception, which has
fallen out of favor, was apparently based on evidentiary concerns.237 For all
other benefits offered by employers, the employee’s continued labor is
enough. Just as a five percent wage increase granted to all employees would
not be considered a gift, even if it had not been bargained for, so too should
a stock option plan not be considered a gift.238
So why, then, have courts and the SEC found plans offering employer
securities not to involve “sales,” when the definition of a “sale” is so clearly
related to contract? As a review of those cases demonstrates, courts have
relied on the analysis of “investment contract” provided by the Court in
Daniel. Recall that the Daniel Court found that the employees did not meet
the “investment of money” prong of the test239 because the employees failed
to make any specific contributions to the plan. The Court could have based
its holding on the fact that the employees did not pay for their share in the
plan with “money,” i.e., cash. However, the Court explicitly noted that an
“investment of money” need not take the form of cash, but could also be
made through goods and services.240 Instead, the Court contended that the
employees had not really contributed anything to the plan, since “[o]nly in
the most abstract sense may it be said that an employee ‘exchanges’ some
portion of his labor in return for [the plan’s] possible benefits.”241 The
Court was unwilling to “segregate” the benefits from the employees’ other
235. See, e.g., Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1267–68; Note, Protecting At Will Employees against Wrongful
Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1819–20 (1980). The
employee’s freedom to quit at any time also provides the necessary reliance to bring a Rule
10b-5 claim. When an employer provides a stock option to employees, the employee values that
option based on the current value of the underlying stock. If that value is based on fraud or
deceit committed by the employer, then the employee has relied on the fraud in valuing the
option, just as a public investor relies on the market price of the stock. For a discussion of the
“fraud-on-the-market” theory used in Rule 10b-5 actions, see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224
(1988).
236. See, e.g., Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)
(citing cases).
237. See id. at 924–25. Several courts have required additional consideration on the part of
the employer in order for the employer to remove job security provisions from the employment
contract. See, e.g., Demasse, 984 P.2d at 1144–45; Doyle v. Holy Cross Hosp., 708 N.E.2d 1140 (Ill. 1999).
238. For a broader discussion about the implicit bargain struck between a firm and its
employees, see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 276–87 (1999), and Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder
Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1195–99 (2002).
239. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559–61 (1979). The Howey test for
investment contracts is “whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.” SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S.
293, 301 (1946).
240. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 560 n.12.
241. Id. at 560.
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compensation and say that part of the employees’ labor was compensated
through the pension plan. Instead, the Court insisted that an employee
“surrenders his labor as a whole, and in return receives a compensation
package that is substantially devoid of aspects resembling a security.”242
Since, overall, an employee labored to obtain his wages and not his pension
plan, the Court held that the employee had not made any “investment” in
the plan.
What the Court seems to be saying in Daniel is that the employment
contract as a whole is not really an investment contract for purposes of the
Howey test.243 But that was not really the question posed by the “investment”
prong of the test, which only requires that some investment of value be
made. There is no requirement that the investment must be made
singularly, or that the investment must not be only one part of a more
complex transaction.244 Thus, to show that no investment had been made,
the Court was forced to argue that the employees had not really invested in
the plan, since they did not directly contribute.245 Clearly, though, the
employees were invested in the plan; even though they did not directly
contribute, the employer made contributions to the plan based on employee
work-hours, and those contributions eventually ended up in employees’
pockets. Moreover, the employees’ collective bargaining representatives had
negotiated these contributions on the employees’ behalf.246 Thus, employees
had chosen to have the employer invest monies in the pension plan; the
contributions were akin to a wage. As the court in Harris explained, in
holding that a distribution of employer stock through an ESOP was a “sale”
under the securities laws:
Plaintiff’s actions in this case can be likened to an individual who
receives compensation from his or her employer and then turns
around and buys the stock of the employer. If this two-step
transaction had in fact taken place, there could be little quarrel
that the federal securities laws would apply. The collapse of this
two-step transaction into a single step does not remove the
applicability of the federal securities laws.247
This same analysis applies to the Daniel scenario: employees could have
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. As one commentator noted: “[D]oes it make sense to hold that a standard equity share
acquired for a week’s work is a security whereas the same share acquired together with $200,
indivisibly in consideration for two weeks’ work, is not?” Scott FitzGibbon, What is a Security?—A
Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Participate in the Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REV. 893, 905
(1980).
245. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 560.
246. Id. at 553–54.
247. Harris v. Republic Airlines, Inc., [1987–1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 93,772 (D.D.C. May 19, 1988), 1988 WL 56256, at *10.
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had the employer give the money to them and then could have invested that
money in the pension plan.
Courts have applied the reasoning in Daniel to the analysis of whether a
“sale” of employer securities to employees has taken place under section
10(b) of the 1934 Act.248 Since the Daniel Court held that employees had not
contributed to the pension plan, even though the employer had paid into
the plan on employees’ behalf, it was a small step for courts to reason that
employees had not “contributed” to similar stock or stock option plans and
therefore had not provided any consideration.249 This reasoning construes
contribution, as well as “sale,” too narrowly. As a matter of contract law, the
transfer of stock options from employer to employee is a “sale” regardless of
whether this transfer is explicitly bargained for. As one commentator
explained:
Many employment relationships lack a bargaining process, but all
involve an outcome that fairly can be described as a bargain. A
bargain involving only an outcome is just as much a contract as a
bargain involving both a process and an outcome.250
The distinction between individually negotiated options and group
option plans is therefore a meaningless one for purposes of contract law and
the Acts’ definition of “sale.” Courts and the SEC must recognize the
obvious and conclude that groups plans are just as much of a “sale” as
individual option agreements.
B. POLICY CONCERNS: EMPLOYEES AS INVESTORS
If the distinction between employees evidenced in the Cendant decisions
is flawed on a doctrinal level, that distinction is even more troubling from a
policy perspective. It provides the protection of Rule 10b-5 actions to
executives, managers, and other high-level employees who negotiate private
agreements for themselves and leaves employees who receive their options
from a group plan out in the cold. If anything, policy would suggest an
opposite course: protect the workers in a group plan and leave the
executives to fend for themselves. Because executives are likely to have
greater access to information that is material to investment decisions, as well
as greater control over the firm’s successes and failures, they are less in need
of securities fraud protection than lower level employees.
248. See McLaughlin v. Cendant Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 539, 544 (D.N.J. 1999) (“[C]ourts
apply the SEC’s ‘no sale’ doctrine when an employee’s plan is found to be compulsory and
noncontributory.” (citing Daniel, 439 U.S. at 558–59)).
249. See Wyatt v. Cendant Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 550, 556–57 (D.N.J. 2000) (finding that
plaintiffs had not provided any “‘specific consideration’ or added value” that was “traceable” to
the option plan); Bauman v. Bish, 571 F. Supp. 1054, 1064 (N.D. W. Va. 1983) (finding that the
reduction in employees’ wages did not satisify the “notion of consideration or value necessary to
find a sale of securities”).
250. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP.
L. 657, 706 (1996).
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1. Greater Access to Information
The raison d’être of the Securities Acts is to protect the common investor
through disclosure. While the Acts are certainly not limited to passive
investors251 or to the public markets, they were created in response to
widespread misinformation and fraud that had shattered investor
confidence in the stock exchanges.252 The Acts are designed to require
disclosure of information about securities and to punish the use of
misinformation.253 These measures are necessary since investors need
information to assess the value of a security,254 and this information may not
be accessible to an investor without regulation. As the court explained in
Slevin v. Pedersen Associates, Inc.,255 “securities laws were enacted to provide
surveillance for those not in a position to monitor their own investments . . .
[and to] protect the integrity of financial interests that unsuspecting
investors are incapable of investigating for themselves.”256
Given the importance of information in securities regulation, it would
seem logical to provide greater protections to those who are less likely to
have access to material information about the security. However, the Cendant
cases upend this distinction: managers and executives, who are more likely
to have the type of information that the Acts regulate, are more likely to be
able to sue under Rule 10b-5, while rank-and-file employees who get their
options through a plan cannot. Although lower-level employees may have
pockets of information about the firm’s financial health, high-level
managers and executives have much greater proximity and access to the type
of information that affects the price of the company’s stock. Moreover,
executives with the power to bargain for stock options are in a much better
position to bargain for the information about the company necessary to
evaluate the options’ value. Employees who receive their options through a
company plan often have little bargaining power to insist on such
disclosure.257
The collapse of the Enron Corporation provides a contemporary
example of the differences in information access between high-level
251. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 692 (1985).
252. See S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 1 (1933).
253. See id.; see also Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir. 1970).
254. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (1991)
(“The securities laws exist because of the unique informational needs of investors. . . . Deciding
whether to buy or sell a security thus requires reliable information about such matters as the
issuer’s financial condition, products and markets, management, and competitive and
regulatory climate.”).
255. 540 F. Supp. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
256. Id. at 441.
257. Cf. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 699 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the securities laws should protect “an investor who is not in a position
to negotiate appropriate contractual warranties and to insist on access to inside information
before consummating the transaction”).
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executives and lower-level employees. Enron was brought down almost
entirely by accounting tricks and secret partnerships created and maintained
by the company’s highest leadership.258 The special purpose entities set up
by chief financial officer Andrew Fastow were known only by those in the
very upper levels of management; Sherron Watkins, whose secret memo to
firm president and CEO Kenneth Lay expressed concern about such
entities, was a vice-president who had previously worked at Arthur
Andersen.259 The great bulk of the company’s employees appear to have had
no knowledge of these improprieties. Moreover, many of Enron’s high-level
executives had been dumping their stock and stock options prior to the
company’s breakdown;260 many Enron employees, on the other hand, held
onto their Enron stock and stock options until the bitter end.261
The Cendant flip is even more ironic given that Rule 10b-5 is the
primary weapon against insider trading. The rule, on its face, does not
appear to concern insider trading, since its text focuses on fraud or
misrepresentation, not failures to disclose.262 However, the SEC and the
courts have found that failure to disclose special knowledge on the part of
the buyer or seller violates the antifraud provisions. In defining the cause of
action against insider trading under Rule 10b-5, the SEC created two
prerequisites for an obligation to disclose material information: “first, the
existence of a relationship giving access . . . to information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose . . . and second, the inherent
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.”263 The SEC
further described insiders as “those persons who are in a special relationship
with a company and privy to its internal affairs.”264 Such insiders are barred
from cashing in on their inside information by trading with ignorant
investors.265 As the Second Circuit stated in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,266
258. See FUSARO & MILLER, supra note 8, at xi-xii; John R. Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith,
Corporate Veil; Behind Enron’s Fall, A Culture of Operating Outside Public’s View, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5,
2001, at A1, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 29679873, reprinted in THE BEST BUSINESS STORIES OF THE
YEAR: 2003 EDITION 62–73 (Andrew Leckey & Allan Sloan eds., 2003).
259. See FUSARO & MILLER, supra note 8, at 154–55.
260. See id. at 115, 122. Enron insiders allegedly sold more than $1 billion in company stock
before the stock’s collapse. Id. at 115; see also David Barboza, Ex-Executives Say Sham Deal Helped
Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2002, at A1, available at 2002 WL 25399978.
261. One former Enron employee said he was “dumb” and “gullible” for not exercising his
options, while another said: “If I had just dumped [my options], I would have been rolling in
cash. But I didn’t because upper management—Jeff Skilling and Ken Lay—were telling us the
stock would easily hit one-ten, one-twenty. . . . And it did—Skilling just had the decimal in the
wrong place.” Manning & Kinsey Hill, supra note 9, at 85–86.
262. See COX ET AL., supra note 254, at 824.
263. In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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the policy behind Rule 10b-5’s ban on insider trading is “the justifiable
expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on
impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material
information.”267
While the SEC and the courts have not provided a specific definition of
“insiders,” the term includes those who owe fiduciary duties directly to the
corporation’s shareholders, such as directors and officers.268 Managers and
executives who receive their options through individual negotiations are
likely to owe such fiduciary duties.269 Lower-level employees are much less
likely to have access to “insider” information, and thus would not be
considered insiders. For example, in SEC v. Fox,270 the court found that
defendants, all supervisory employees within a division of the company, did
not have a duty to disclose the information they had about the corporation
because they were not insiders.271 While the employees had knowledge that
certain corporate reductions in production were being considered, they did
not participate in the actual corporate decision to reduce production and
project losses, which the parties acknowledged to be the event that triggered
a decline in the stock.272 Thus, while employees may owe a duty not to
disclose or trade on information about high level firm decisions,273 they may
not be deemed insiders when shop-level information is at issue.
Because Rule 10b-5 is meant to protect against fraud committed by firm
insiders, it is bizarre that the courts and the SEC have created an
interpretation of Rule 10b-5 that protects those likely to be insiders but not
those likely to be outsiders. Yet that is the result of the Cendant decisions and
SEC policy.
2. Greater Control Over Firm
Employees who receive their stock options as part of a group plan are
also less likely than executives to have control over the direction of the firm.
267. Id. at 848; see also Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912 n.15 (“A significant purpose of the
Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that the use of inside information for personal
advantage was a normal emolument of corporate office.”).
268. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
269. Even if executives may not be labeled as “officers” of the corporation under its bylaws,
they will often have the same fiduciary duties as agents of the firm. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW §3.3, at 114 (1986).
270. 654 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
271. Id. at 791.
272. See id. at 791–92.
273. See, e.g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (holding that employees
who are not officers or directors were insiders when they possessed information that should be
used only for a corporate purpose); Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 7 (Del. Ch. 1949)
(holding that an employee does have a fiduciary duty when he acquires “secret information
relating to his employer’s business” in the course of employment); CLARK, supra note 269,
§8.10, at 323.
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They are less likely to have any influence over or participation in the firm’s
ultimate decisions about direction, products, earnings, or growth strategies.
Because they lack power within the firm, they have a greater need for the
protection of the securities laws. The big players who individually negotiate
for options are more likely to have a hand in the management of the firm—
and thus more likely to have input into or control over a firm’s decision to
defraud its investors. Again, the distinction between high-level executives
and lower-level employees at Enron is instructive. The chief executives at
Enron were responsible for the decisions that led to the alleged fraud; the
rest of the employees had no influence or control over these decisions.
Courts have used the extent of control over the firm as another factor
in determining whether certain investors should be protected by federal
securities regulation.274 Unlike the Cendant distinction, however, courts have
held that those with more control over the firm do not need federal
protection.275 Under the Howey test as originally promulgated, an investment
contract required an investment of money in a common enterprise in which
profits come “solely from the efforts of others.”276 This requirement has
apparently since been softened: in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman,277 the Supreme Court restated the test, requiring profits “to be
derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.”278 If a
person is deeply involved in managing or directing the firm’s efforts, her
investment in that entity will not be deemed an investment contract and
thus will not be a “security.” Executives, however, are far more likely to exert
“entrepreneurial or managerial efforts” than are lower-level employees. As
the Court noted in Forman, the Howey test “embodies the essential attributes
that run through all of the Court’s decisions defining a security.”279 If one of
the essential elements of a security is that its profits be derived from the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others, stock options held by
executives and managers are less likely to have that attribute than such
options held by lower-level employees.
In many ways managers and executives are similarly situated to partners
274. See infra text accompanying notes 279–87.
275. See id.
276. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
277. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
278. Id. at 852. The Court explicitly chose not to pass on whether the word “solely” should
be read literally. See id. at 852 n.16. However, it did note that the Ninth Circuit did not read the
term literally, but rather “realistically, so as to include within the definition those schemes
which involve in substance, if not in form, securities.” Id. (citing SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973)). The lower courts have generally used the less
stringent Turner formulation. See COX ET AL., supra note 254, at 133–35.
279. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852, cited in Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558
n.11 (1979). To be sure, the Howey analysis would not prevent an executive’s stock options from
meeting the definition of a “security” under the Acts, as those options need not meet the
requirements of “investment contract.”
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in a business venture seeking to sue the partnership under the securities
laws. In most cases, the partnership interests of general partners will not
meet the second prong of the Howey test because a partner has too much
control over the enterprise.280 Courts generally assume that general partners
“possess powers and responsibilities that would enable them to protect their
partnership interests.”281 Thus, because partners can protect themselves,
they do not need the protection of the Securities Acts. As one court put it,
“[t]he managerial powers vested in general partners and the express right of
inspection of documents gives them the kind of leverage and ability to
protect themselves that takes them outside the intended scope of the ‘34
Act.”282
Courts have differed over whether the legal powers of partnership are
sufficient to remove general partners from the definition of a security. While
some courts have focused solely on partnership rights and duties mandated
by law,283 others have found a security, despite these rights and duties, when
the partner can show that he actually depended on managing partners to
exercise control over the business.284 In Williamson v. Tucker,285 the court
held that a general partnership would be a security if (1) the agreement
distributed powers as would a limited partnership, (2) the partner-plaintiff
was so “inexperienced and unknowledgeable” that he was unable to exercise
his partnership powers “intelligently,” or (3) the partner-plaintiff was so
dependent on the “unique entrepreneurial or management ability” of a
promoter or manager that such promoter or manager was irreplaceable.286
The Rule 10b-5 suits by managers or executives with stock options, however,
cut across this grain; they are not dependent investors, but rather active
280. Partnership interests are not listed within the definition of “security” in the Acts. See 15
U.S.C. § 77b(1) (2000); id. § 78c(a)(10). “Because ‘general partnership interests’ are not
explicitly enumerated as ‘securities’ in these definitions, the question remains whether,
nonetheless, they are included within that definition because they are ‘investment contracts.’”
Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992).
281. Douglas M. Fried, General Partnership Interests as Securities Under the Federal Securities Laws:
Substance over Form, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 303, 303–04 (1985).
282. Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 1983).
283. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Elkins, 730 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1984).
284. For example, the Ninth Circuit, in Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115 (9th Cir. 1992),
stated the following:
The heart of this inquiry is whether, although on the face of the partnership
agreement the investor theoretically retains substantial control over the investment
and an ability to protect the investment from the managing partner or hired
manager, the investor nonetheless can demonstrate such dependence on the
promoter or on a third party that the investor was in fact unable to exercise
meaningful partnership powers.
Id. at 1119 (emphasis in original); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981).
285. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981).
286. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424.
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participants. In fact, many of the suits brought by managers or executives
with security interests in their firms are rooted in claims that they were given
less authority or control over the enterprise than they had bargained for.287
High-level employees who bargain for stock options will generally have
greater access to information and more control over the enterprise than
employees who receive their options through a group plan. These
advantages render them less in need of protection from securities
regulation, more specifically Rule 10b-5. Yet these employees are the ones
who will receive that protection under current law. From a doctrinal
perspective, the current distinction between employees is wrong; from a
policy perspective, it is completely backwards. Regardless of whether
employees as a whole should receive Rule 10b-5 protection, the current
doctrine represents the most illogical of all possible solutions.
VI. SHOULD ALL EMPLOYEES BE EXCLUDED FROM
RULE 10B-5 PRIVATE ACTIONS?
The previous Section explained why the law should not provide higher-
level employees with the protections of Rule 10b-5 while excluding lower-
level employees from that same protection. This Section takes the analysis a
step further, arguing that all employees who receive their stock options in
the course of employment should be permitted to bring private actions
under Rule 10b-5. To that end, Subsection A first examines the text of the
Rule, with reference to whether employees should be deemed to have
“purchased” their options. Subsection B considers the argument that
employees have advantages over other investors that make them less
susceptible to fraud, and therefore less likely to need Rule 10b-5. Subsection
C addresses concerns that employees could abuse Rule 10b-5 or use it to
gain improper advantages over management or shareholders. Subsection D
discusses the potential that the imposition of Rule 10b-5 liability will lead
employers to stop providing employees with stock options. Finally,
Subsection E discusses the possibility that other regulatory protections, such
as ERISA or state common law, are better vehicles for providing employees
with protections against fraud or deception.
A. EMPLOYEES AND RULE 10B-5’S “PURCHASE” REQUIREMENT
The doctrinal hinge for the current distinction between employees as to
Rule 10b-5 protection is the rule’s “purchase or sale” requirement. As
287. See, e.g., Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition Inst., Inc., 751 F.2d 555, 557 (2d Cir. 1985)
(plaintiff alleged that company misrepresented amount of funds available to develop new
product line); Rudinger v. Ins. Data Processing, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(plaintiff alleged that owner promised him “complete operating control” of the company but
never intended to grant this); Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282, 1284 (D. Mass. 1972)
(plaintiff alleged that firm falsely told him he would have access to significant funds to develop
and market a product line).
BODIE_CONV 03/15/03 9:55 PM
EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS AND RULE 10B-5 581
discussed in Section III, Rule 10b-5 only protects against fraud that was
committed “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”288
Looking solely at the colloquial definitions of the words “sale” and
“purchase,” an argument could be made that employees do not “purchase”
securities when they receive them in exchange for labor. The common
definition of a sale or purchase is “the exchange of goods or services for an
amount of money or its equivalent.”289 While economists may not have any
difficulty perceiving that an employer purchases labor from its employees,
we do not generally envision ourselves as “selling” our services to our
employers. In most securities transactions, the security represents the “good”
that is exchanged for “money or its equivalent.” In the employment context,
however, a good (the security) is being exchanged for a service (labor). This
type of transaction fits the definition of “barter,” rather than purchase.290
One could argue that the colloquial definition of “sale” limits Rule 10b-5’s
application to transactions that involve the exchange of a security for money,
rather than for other goods or services. If employees did not actually provide
money to the employer in exchange for the option, there would be no
purchase.
However, this argument completely ignores the definitions of “sale” and
“purchase” provided by the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Rule 10b-5 is based on
section 10(b) of the statute, which also requires that the prohibited activity
be committed “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”291
And the statute defines “sale” and “purchase” in very broad terms. The
definition of purchase “include[s] any contract to buy, purchase, or
otherwise acquire,”292 while a sale includes contracts “to sell or otherwise
dispose of.”293 By including contracts that “acquire” and “dispose of”
securities in the definition of purchase and sale, the statute removes the
implication that money must exchange hands in the process. Courts have
therefore not required a “purchase” or “sale” to involve the exchange of
money. In SEC v. National Securities,294 the Supreme Court held that a
shareholder vote to exchange the shareholders’ current securities for stock
in a different company, in order to effectuate a merger, was a “sale” for
purposes of the 1934 Act.295 And in SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp.,296
the Fifth Circuit found a sale when a company issued notes to its customers
288. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002).
289. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1085 (2d coll. ed. 1982) (definition of “sale”).
290. See id. at 160 (defining “barter” as “to trade goods or services without the exchange of
money”).
291. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
292. Id. § 78c(a)(13).
293. Id. § 78c(a)(14).
294. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
295. Id. at 467.
296. 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
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in exchange for the customers’ promise not to institute legal proceedings.297
Thus, to fence out employee stock options from the realm of purchase
or sale, courts would have to single out the employment contract from other
contracts in which something other than money is exchanged for a security.
Courts might choose to do so, for some of the reasons discussed below. But
as a matter of textual interpretation, the statute forecloses the possibility that
a court might use the definition of purchase, by itself, to exclude
employees.298
B. EMPLOYEE INFORMATION ADVANTAGES
Just as a company’s grant of employee stock options is not the
prototypical “sale” of a security, employees do not seem to fit the prototype
of the “public investor.” By virtue of their employment, workers necessarily
have access to information that the average market purchaser does not.
However, is such information sufficient to obviate the need for anti-fraud
protection?
The SEC has treated employees differently than members of the
investing public in other contexts. For example, Rule 701,299 created by the
SEC in 1988, permits private companies to offer shares to employees without
adhering to the Section 5 registration requirements.300 Under the rule,
companies whose stock is not publicly traded may offer shares (or derivatives
such as options) to employees or certain consultants as a private placement
under Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act.301 The securities must be offered
through a written compensatory benefit plan or compensation contract.302
The SEC justified the exception on the grounds that the shares were offered
for compensatory and incentive purposes, rather than for capital raising.303
297. See id. at 528; cf. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 n.12 (1979)
(noting that a person’s “investment,” for purposes of the Howey test, may be made through
goods or services, as well as cash).
298. As a doctrinal matter, a court could also use a definitional escape hatch to elude the
statute’s definition of purchase and sale. The definitional section of the 1934 Act provides for
the use of those definitions “unless the context otherwise requires.” Courts and commentators
have differed over the meaning of this clause. See supra text accompanying notes 126–30.
However, this move would require some factor (such as policy reasons) external to the
definition of “security” itself.
299. 17 C.F.R. § 230.701 (2002).
300. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).
301. Id. § 77c(b). However, while Section 3(b) refers to exempted securities, securities
issued under Rule 701 are restricted securities as defined under Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144
(2002).
302. 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(5)(c) (2002).
303. See Exemption for Certain Employee Benefit Plans, Securities Act of 1933 Release No.
6683, 52 Fed. Reg. 3015 (Jan. 16, 1987) (“It has been suggested that since such plans and
arrangements are primarily compensatory in nature and incentive oriented, rather than
designed to raise capital, special accommodation should be made under the federal securities
laws.”).
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In 1999, after some prodding from Congress,304 the SEC removed the $5
million cap on the exception, noting that the cap had become
“unnecessarily restrictive in light of inflation, the increased popularity of
equity ownership as a retention and incentive device for employees, and the
growth of deferred compensation plans.”305 In place of the cap, issuers are
required to provide certain disclosures to employees when the offering
exceeds the $5 million threshold. Issuers must provide copies of the benefit
plan, a summary of the plan’s terms, an analysis of the risk factors associated
with the security, and certain financial statements.306
In justifying the 1999 changes, the SEC stated:
The type and amount of disclosure needed in a compensatory
securities transaction differs from that needed in a capital-raising
transaction. In a bona fide compensatory arrangement, the issuer is
concerned primarily with compensating the employee-investor
rather than maximizing its proceeds from the sale. Because the
compensated individual has some business relationship, perhaps
extending over a long period of time, with the securities issuer, that
person will have acquired some, and in many cases, a substantial
amount of knowledge about the enterprise. The amount and type
of disclosure required for this person is not the same as for the
typical investor with no particular connection with the issuer. The
current standards of financial statement disclosure contained in
Regulation A should satisfy our concerns for a level of disclosure
that will provide basic protections in a compensatory transaction
but may not be available as a result of ordinary employment or
business dealings.307
Thus, the SEC has carved out an exception to its reporting
requirements based on the potentially “substantial” knowledge that
employees have about their employers. At the same time, however, the SEC
has indicated that this base of knowledge is not sufficient to insulate
employees from fraud—after all, in offerings greater than $5 million, Rule
701 does require the disclosure of information sufficient to provide “basic
protections” that “may not be available” to ordinary workers.308 In addition,
the rule notes that issuers “have an obligation to provide investors with
disclosure adequate to satisfy the antifraud provisions of the federal
304. See Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 7645 (Feb. 25, 1999), 1999 WL 95489, at *17 n.6
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 38 (1996) and S. REP. NO. 104-293, at 16 (1996)).
305. Id.
306. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(5)(e) (2002). The financial statements are the same as those
required under Regulation A, which provides an exception to Section 5 registration for limited
(under $5 million) public offerings. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263 (1992).
307. Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 7645 (Feb. 25, 1999), 1999 WL 95489, at *5.
308. Id.
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securities laws.”309 As the SEC made clear, “[c]ompliance with the minimum
disclosure standards for Rule 701 may not necessarily meet the antifraud
standards . . . .”310 Exemption from the disclosure laws is an order of
magnitude less than an exemption from Rule 10b-5.
Moreover, it is important to note that Rule 701 is an exception carved
out of the general rule that employees are public investors for purposes of
registration requirements. In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,311 the company had
sold shares of its stock to certain “key employees” without registration.312 The
company contended that these employees, who occupied positions such as
bakeshop foreman, clerical assistant, and production trainee, were
sufficiently sophisticated that the offering should be considered a private
placement under section 4(2) of the 1933 Act.313 However, the Court held
that the offering must be considered public, and therefore had been carried
out illegally. The Court acknowledged that an offering to certain employees
could be considered a private placement—for example, “executive
personnel who because of their position have access to the same kind of
information that the [1933] act would make available in the form of a
registration statement.”314 However, the company failed to show that the
“key employees” who were offered securities had this kind of access.315
Without such information, “employees are just as much members of the
investing ‘public’ as any of their neighbors in the community.”316 Noting that
Congress had rejected a 1934 amendment excluding employee stock
offerings from registration requirements, the Court quoted the following
passage from the House Managers: “[T]he participants in employees’ stock-
investment plans may be in as great a need of the protection afforded by the
availability of information concerning the issuer for which they work as are
most other members of the public.”317
Elsewhere in securities regulation, employees as a whole are not
309. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(1) (1999).
310. Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 7645 (Feb. 25, 1999), 1999 WL 95489, at *13.
311. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
312. Id. at 121–22.
313. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2000). At the time of the case, this section was designated section
4(1) of the 1933 Act. It was redesignated in 1964. See 78 Stat. 580 (Aug. 20, 1964).
314. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 125–26.
315. Id. at 126.
316. Id. As the SEC General Counsel noted in 1935:
[A]n offering to members of a class who should have special knowledge of the
issuer is less likely to be a public offering than is an offering to the members of a
class of the same size who do not have this advantage. This factor would be
particularly important in offerings to employees, where a class of high executive
officers would have a special relationship to the issuer which subordinate
employees would not enjoy.
Id. at 126 n.12 (quoting 11 Fed. Reg. 10,952 (1935)).
317. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73-1838, at 41 (1934)).
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assumed to have the kind of information that would eliminate their need for
protection. As noted earlier, employees are only considered “insiders” in the
context of insider trading if they trade on high-level information, and even
then may escape liability if they did not take part in corporate decision-
making regarding the information.318 Liability under section 16 of the 1934
Act for “short-swing” profits—profits from trading by insiders within a six
month period—applies only to trading done by 10 percent owners,
directors, or officers.319 Such short-swing trades are prohibited “[f]or the
purpose of preventing the unfair use of information” obtained by the insider
“by reason of his relationship to the issuer.”320 The SEC rules define officers
to include, along with presidents and chief financial officers, “any other
person who performs similar policy-making functions for the issuer.”321 The
SEC notes that in determining section 16 coverage, “the proper focus should
be on whether a person is ‘a corporate employee performing important
executive duties of such character that he would be likely, in discharging
these duties, to obtain confidential information about the company’s affairs
that would aid him if he engaged in personal market transactions.’”322 In
Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Livingston,323 cited with approval by
the SEC,324 the Ninth Circuit held that a securities salesman who was given
the title of vice-president was not an officer for purposes of section 16. The
court acknowledged that the salesman had access to information that was
“not generally available to the investing public.”325 However, the court
explained:
Insider information, to which Section 16(b) is addressed, does not
mean all information about the company that is not public
knowledge. . . . Information that is freely circulated among non-
management employees is not insider information within the
meaning of Section 16(b), even if the general public does not have
the same information. Employees of corporations know all kinds of
things about the companies they work for and about the personnel
of their concerns that are not within the public domain. Rather,
insider information to which Section 16(b) refers is the kind of
information that is commonly reserved for company management
318. See supra text accompanying notes 270–73.
319. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2000).
320. Id. § 78p(b).
321. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1 (1995).
322. 56 Fed. Reg. 7243 (Feb. 21, 1991) (quoting Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1949)).
323. 566 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1978).
324. 56 Fed. Reg. 7242, 7243 (Feb. 21, 1991).
325. Livingston, 566 F.2d at 1121 (noting that defendant had access to information on the
growth production rankings on the various Merrill Lynch retail offices).
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and is thus the type of information that would “aid (one) if he
engaged in personal market transactions.”326
Thus, while all employees may have some information unavailable to a
public shareholder, only a small slice of employees have access to “insider”
information.
Employees certainly have informational advantages over other investors.
However, the extent of this advantage varies widely amongst employees.
Employees as a whole do not have access to information sufficient to protect
themselves against fraud by a company’s true insiders. As discussed earlier,
the recent examples of Enron, Global Crossing, and WorldCom
demonstrate that most employees seem to have little or no awareness of
fraud perpetrated at the highest levels. Carving out a blanket employee
exception to Rule 10b-5 based on a presumed informational advantage
grossly overestimates the advantage, and unfairly subjects employees to fraud
without recourse by those with true control over the company.
C. EMPLOYEE LITIGATION OPPORTUNISM
Another potential argument for excluding employees from Rule 10b-5
protection is the fear of employee litigation opportunism: namely, that
employees will use Rule 10b-5 litigation for illegitimate ends. The primary
reason for the “purchase or sale” requirement is the Supreme Court’s fear of
speculative and vexatious litigation.327 While suits by employees do not raise
the same kinds of concerns as suits by non-sellers or almost-purchasers, they
do present some potential concerns about improper use. Employees could
file a meritless fraud suit in an effort to embarrass the company, or to extort
an increase in wages from it. Or employees could use Rule 10b-5 discovery to
find out information about the company that was not available to them
otherwise, either through individual means or collective bargaining. Finally,
employees could infiltrate a class of non-employee investors and agree to a
settlement that was not in the interests of class members as a whole.
Concern about the proliferation of private 10b-5 litigation—particularly
class actions—has long occupied commentators and policymakers. Such
litigation is viewed as particularly susceptible to abuse, due to broad federal
discovery procedures and the lack of sanctions for frivolous suits.328 Federal
rules permit extensive discovery once the claim has survived the pleading
phase.329 Because a securities fraud action concerns a company’s failure to
disclose material information relating to its value as a company, the
discovery process has the potential to expose a wealth of information that
the firm would normally keep private. Moreover, the process of producing
326. Id. at 1121, 1222–23 (alteration in original) (quoting Colby, 178 F.2d at 873).
327. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 743 (1975).
328. See id. at 741.
329. See, e.g., id.
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relevant documents siphons away time and resources from the ongoing
business. Because a company has a strong interest in avoiding discovery, it
may be willing to settle a non-meritorious claim for substantial sums.
Although the extent of this phenomenon was never definitively established,
commentators and Congress believe it to be a serious problem.330
Obviously, fencing out employees from the opportunity to bring 10b-5
suits would reduce the amount of such litigation in the system, frivolous or
otherwise. But if employees are more likely to file frivolous claims than
public investors are, in order to take advantage of their employers, it may
make sense to prevent them from bringing Rule 10b-5 actions. Employees
may be more likely to file a frivolous claim because it may be easier for them
to obtain a quick and dirty settlement. Public investors generally do not file
individual claims against a firm for securities fraud since the potential
damages do not justify the litigation expenses. It is extremely difficult to
assemble a class of investors without using the class action procedures, and a
public investor who initiates a class action suit cannot settle the claim
without a judicial determination that the settlement benefits the class.331
Thus, it could be expensive for a firm to pay off a class action suit in a way
that meets the lead plaintiff’s litigation expenses. Employees, however, could
much more easily join together as a group of plaintiffs without the need for
a class action. And by not aspiring to represent a broader class, employees
could accept a settlement that benefits only them: for example, an increase
in wages. Thus, somewhat counterintuitively, employees may be more
effective at coercing a settlement out of frivolous fraud claims because they
can be bought off more cheaply.
In addition, employees may also have an interest in discovery beyond its
value in coercing the company to settle. A public investor looking to coerce
a settlement has no inherent interest in the information that could be
obtained through discovery; the investor simply knows that the firm wants to
avoid producing it. However, employees have an interest in such
information apart from their role as investors; they may also be able to use it
in their negotiations with the company as employees. Information about the
company’s actual and projected earnings, actual and projected profits,
potential mergers or acquisitions, plant openings and closings, and other
private financial data is all fodder for employees in their negotiations with
330. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 14 (1995) (noting that plaintiffs’ lawyers had incentives to “file
frivolous lawsuits in order to conduct discovery in the hopes of finding a sustainable claim not
alleged in the complaint”); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-3691, at 31 (1995) (discussing “the abuse
of the discovery process to impose costs so burdensome that it is often economical for the
victimized party to settle”). For contrasting commentators’ views, compare Joseph A. Grundfest,
Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1995), with Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A
Comment on Professor Grundfest’s “Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws:
The Commission’s Authority,” 108 HARV. L. REV. 438 (1994).
331. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2001).
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the company over the terms of employment. This information may not be
generally available to the employees or to their collective bargaining
representative (if they have one).332 Indeed, an employee group could file a
non-meritorious lawsuit looking not for an expensive settlement but instead
for secret financial information potentially available through discovery.333
These concerns only point to the reasons why employees may be more
likely to file non-meritorious claims. Employees do not have any advantages,
however, in getting their claims past the company’s initial motion to dismiss.
To address the general concern about 10b-5 litigation abuse, in 1995
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).334
The PSLRA instituted a number of procedural requirements designed to
filter out frivolous suits. Along with “lead plaintiff” and other class action
reforms, the PSLRA requires plaintiffs to plead the alleged fraud with
greater particularity, both as to the alleged misstatements or omissions335
and the alleged fraudulent intent.336 Circuits are split as to whether the
PSLRA actually heightened the requisite intent required to prove securities
fraud.337 However, the PSLRA certainly made it more difficult to get a fraud
claim past a motion to dismiss based only on a drop in stock price. Plaintiffs
must now plead the particular facts that allegedly constitute the fraud.338
332. See, e.g., NLRB v. Truitt Mfg., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956); Pine Indus. Relations Comm.
Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1061 (1957).
333. For a discussion of the use of a 10b-5 claim to obtain information about an employer,
see Bauman v. Bish, 571 F. Supp. 1054, 1058 (N.D. W. Va. 1983), which noted that the “sole
purpose of this litigation,” which involved 10b-5 and other claims brought by employees against
an employer, “is to obtain what has been labeled as a confidential appendix” to a study
conducted by consultants about the viability of a proposed ESOP plan.
334. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995)
(codified throughout various sections of 15 U.S.C.).
335. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2000):
In any private action arising under this chapter . . . the complaint shall specify each
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the
statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission
is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all
facts on which that belief is formed.
336. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000):
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff may recover
money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of
mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate
this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind.
337. Compare In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that “a private securities plaintiff proceeding under the PSLRA must plead, in great
detail, facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless or conscious
misconduct,” thereby heightening the pleading requirements), with Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d
300, 310 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding that “the enactment of paragraph (b)(2) did not change
the basic pleading standard for scienter”).
338. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)–(2) (2000).
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These heightened pleading requirements are the proper approach to
preventing employee opportunism. Rather than disallowing all employee
suits, meritorious and non-meritorious alike, courts should place greater
effort on preventing spurious claims from exacting concessions from
companies. Moreover, firms are likely to alert courts to the illegitimate
agendas that lurk behind non-meritorious employee suits, and courts can
thereby take steps to prevent the litigation from achieving such an agenda.
For example, when a company asserts that its employees are attempting to
use the discovery phase to get confidential information, a court alert to this
goal could monitor discovery to limit its scope or protect confidentiality.
Courts should also monitor litigation so as to avoid conflicts of interest
between employees and other shareholders. Obviously, employees should
not be able to settle the claims of all shareholders based on a settlement that
benefits only their own narrow interests.339 However, it should be relatively
easy for courts to avoid this result by either monitoring settlements to make
sure all shareholders benefit or by separating employees into a separate
action. Moreover, allowing employees to bring private 10b-5 claims likely
would help other public investors obtain relief for fraud. Employees, who
have daily contact with the company, may be more likely to detect signs of
fraud before less connected investors could do so. Public investors will
benefit if employees have an incentive to bring this fraud to light.340 Even if
employees settle their claims separately from other investors, these investors
will at least be alerted to the opportunity to bring a suit themselves.
In sum, the risk of employee litigation opportunism is an insufficient
concern, particularly if properly cabined, to deny employees the right to sue
under 10b-5.
D. CHILLING EFFECTS ON EMPLOYEE OPTIONS
Although access to Rule 10b-5 litigation is ostensibly a valued right,
employees may fear that employers will grant fewer options to them if
employees were permitted to bring private Rule 10b-5 actions. This
argument is based on simple cost-benefit analysis: employers may decide that
Rule 10b-5 exposure increases the cost of granting options to a level where it
is no longer economically sensible to provide them. Theoretically, an
employer that did not plan on committing fraud should not have this
concern: if no fraud suits are commenced, there are no litigation costs.
However, an innocent employer may still fear frivolous litigation enough to
eliminate its options program. Ultimately, if employers assume Rule 10b-5
liability for all employee stock option grants, employees as a whole may be
339. Nor should management employees be able to hijack litigation by settling shareholder
claims for a nominal amount in order to protect the firm and its management.
340. Cf. Alan Hyde, Ownership, Contract, and Politics in the Protection of Employees Against Risk,
43 U. TORONTO L.J. 721, 730–33 (1993).
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worse off. Those with options will have the power to sue for fraud, but fewer
employees will receive options.341
This argument could, of course, be made about any form of regulation,
since regulation generally imposes costs on the industry or activity it is
regulating. And it could be applied to stock sales as a whole: stocks would be
priced cheaper, and therefore people could buy more of them, if companies
did not have to account for antifraud protection. But the antifraud
protection of Rule 10b-5, like the rest of the substantive provisions of
securities regulation, cannot be waived by investors.342 Certainly, Rule 10b-5
imposes costs on the issuance of securities, and there may be some instances
in which issuers and investors would choose to waive those protections if
possible.343 But the purpose of the regulation would be defeated if investors
could waive out of their protections. As the Supreme Court noted in
Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,344 substantive securities
regulation “cannot be waived under the rationale that [such regulation] was
intended to place buyers of securities on an equal footing with sellers.”345
Antifraud protection is particularly important to free markets, because fraud
distorts the information upon which bargains are struck.346 The Coase
341. This argument may be best illustrated with a short hypothetical. Let’s assume that
under the current system, 100 employees in different companies receive stock options. Fraud
committed against five of these employees renders their options worthless. Thus, employees as a
whole have received the equivalent of ninety-five options. If employees are given the
opportunity to sue under 10b-5, that fraud can be remedied. However, fewer employers will be
giving out options. If only eighty employees get options under the new regime, and five suffer
fraud that renders their options worthless, the net number of employee options will be eighty
(after the five defrauded employees obtain relief equivalent to the option’s value). The
employees as a group are better off under the old system.
342. See 15 U.S.C. § 77h (2000) (section 14 of the 1933 Act) (prohibiting waiver of the 1933
Act’s provisions); 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(u) (2000) (section 29 of the 1934 Act) (prohibiting waiver of
the 1934 Act’s provisions); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 228
(1987) (stating that section 29(a) “prohibits waiver of the substantive obligations imposed by
the Exchange Act”).
343. As the Court noted in Shearson:
[A] customer cannot negotiate a reduction in commissions in exchange for a
waiver of compliance with the requirements of the Exchange Act, even if the
customer knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the bargain. Section 29(a) is
concerned, not with whether brokers maneuvered customers into an agreement,
but with whether the agreement weakens their ability to recover under the
Exchange Act.
Shearson, 482 U.S. at 230 (quotations and citation omitted).
344. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
345. Id. at 481.
346. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 122 (5th ed. 1998) (“Even when
nothing has happened since the signing of the contract to make performance uneconomical,
discharge may be permitted where the presumption that performance would produce a value-
increasing exchange is rebutted, as when it is shown that the promisee induced the promise by
a lie.”).
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theorem, which posits that parties will bargain to an efficient outcome
whatever the regulatory scheme, assumes that parties cannot defraud each
other.347 Even those who argue that much of securities regulation is
unnecessary or counterproductive assume that investors will have protection
against fraud.348
Employees should not be saddled with the cost of employer fraud.
Under the current system, management not only escapes the financial costs
of the options to the bottom line,349 but it also escapes the financial
consequences of fraud against the employees. The Cendant distinction
essentially permits employers to use fraud in promoting the value of their
stock in order to deceive employees. If employers were claiming to give their
employees bars of gold as compensation, but some of those bars turned out
to be fool’s gold, employers would not be allowed to continue this practice
merely on the threat that some of them might choose to stop giving out the
bars. Although some employers may potentially cut back on option grants if
opened up to Rule 10b-5 liability, those employers are probably the ones
whose employees need the most protection.
Moreover, it is far from clear that imposing Rule 10b-5 liability upon
employers will lead to a sharp decrease in the number of options given to
employees. In many (if not most) companies, employees with options
represent only a small percentage of the shareholders with an equity stake in
the firm. Giving such employees antifraud protection will only mean that
they have the same protection afforded to other investors, who have their
own incentives to bring Rule 10b-5 suits. Moreover, those employees who
exercise their options and purchase stock unquestionably meet the Rule
10b-5 “purchase or sale” requirement, and thus are able to sue. Employers
are probably not counting on the fact that they can perpetually escape fraud
liability claims from their employees with options. Most employers probably
recognize the baseline necessity of antifraud provisions; indeed, they may
not even know that certain employees do not currently have that protection.
347. See John F. Barry III, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 1307, 1353–54 n.167 (1981) (discussing Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960)). Others have argued that investors should be allowed to bargain for their own
level of fraud-prevention measures, such as mandatory disclosure. See, e.g., Nicholas L.
Georgakopoulos, Why Should Disclosure Rules Subsidize Informed Traders?, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
417, 418–19 (1996) (using the Coase theorem to argue that investors will bargain for the
appropriate level of fraud-prevention measures). However, fraud-prevention measures such as
required disclosure are different than the antifraud protections themselves, just as
neighborhood watch programs are different than laws criminalizing theft.
348. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 346, at 486–89 (arguing that many aspects of securities
regulation may impede the flow of information to investors, but noting that investors should be
protected from fraud); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 130 (“A critical adjunct to my proposal of disclosure choice is that
issuers in public offerings would be subject to a mandatory antifraud standard—namely, Rule
10b-5 liability.”).
349. See supra Section III.
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If employers assume employees are already covered, then changing the rule
to meet this perception would not significantly frighten employers away
from granting options.
Ultimately, antifraud protection—whatever its “costs” to employees and
employers—is a central component of a free market system.350 Employees
should not be left vulnerable to fraud merely to assuage the fear of certain
employers. Of course, Rule 10b-5 is not just any antifraud statute. Employees
with options may find sufficient protection against fraud through the
common law, ERISA, or other securities regulations. Such possibilities are
addressed below.
E. EMPLOYEE LEGAL PROTECTIONS BEYOND RULE 10B-5
Although Rule 10b-5 is a unique provision in many ways, it is possible
that employees could seek redress against employers for fraud through
other causes of action. If employees can address the same type of fraud and
obtain the same relief through other actions, access to Rule 10b-5 becomes
unimportant. However, other actions may not provide Rule 10b-5 scope of
coverage, or may address the same types of fraud but entail different
procedures or provide different relief. As a result, Rule 10b-5 protection may
be necessary to provide adequate relief. The differences between Rule 10b-5
and other potential causes of action, and what these differences might mean
to defrauded employees, are discussed below.
1. Other Federal Securities Regulation
Since the language of Rule 10b-5 is taken largely from section 17(a) of
the 1933 Securities Act,351 the antifraud provision of that statute, employees
might first look to an action brought under section 17(a) as a replacement
for a Rule 10b-5 action. However, while section 17(a) prohibits fraud in the
“offer or sale” of a security, Rule 10b-5 prohibits fraud in the “purchase or
sale” of the security.352 This difference may not be that significant to
employees, who are primarily concerned with fraud in the security’s sale.
More importantly, courts have rejected attempts to derive a private right of
action from section 17(a).353 Thus, Rule 10b-5 is far more useful to
350. Cf. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV.
347, 390 (1991) (“The social value of preventing fraud in the sale of securities is too clear to
require elaboration.”).
351. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2000).
352. Compare id., with 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).
353. See Finkel v. Stratton Corp., 962 F.2d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing cases from seven
other circuits). In 1990, the Sixth Circuit permitted a private cause of action to go forward
under section 17(a). See Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 899 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1990)
(allowing a private action under section 17(a) by investors against their securities broker and
account representative). However, the court held that “section 17(a) implies a private cause of
action only for ‘purchasers.’” Id. at 492. Thus, employees who were deemed not to be
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defrauded employees than section 17(a).
The Acts’ other civil liability provisions deal with specific situations,
such as proxy fraud,354 tender offer fraud,355 short-swing profits,356 violations
of registration requirements,357 or misrepresentations in registration
statements358 or prospectuses.359 While these provisions may offer relief to
employee options holders in some specific instances, Rule 10b-5 addresses
the staple of most securities litigation: deception or fraud in the sale of a
security.360 Because of their limited scope, the other causes of action under
federal securities law fall far short of Rule 10b-5 coverage and relief.
2. State Securities Regulation
State securities antifraud protections are part of a collection of state
securities regulations commonly referred to as “blue sky” laws.361 Blue sky
laws provided the primary regulation for securities sales from the early part
of the twentieth century up until the federal securities acts were passed in
1933 and 1934. Since then, the focus of investor protection has largely
shifted to the federal arena. One area of state involvement has come in the
so-called “merit” or substantive regulation of securities offerings. In the
1970s and 1980s, state agencies frequently used state registration
requirements to deny registration for offerings that were not deemed “fair,
just and equitable.”362 However, a sizeable number of exemptions from such
requirements diminished their impact.363 In 1996, Congress passed the
National Securities Markets Improvement Act, which broadly preempted
state blue sky registration requirements for nationally traded securities.364
State antifraud regulation has largely hovered around the edges of Rule
10b-5’s coverage. While a panoply of different provisions exist, most state
civil liability provisions have required both proof of reliance and privity of
purchasers for Rule 10b-5 purposes would be excluded for the same reason from a section
17(a) private action.
354. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2002).
355. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2000).
356. See id. § 78p(b).
357. See id. § 77l(a)(1).
358. See id. § 77k.
359. See id. § 77l(a)(2).
360. See JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 138, at 1057 (“Rule 10b-5 is the basic federal securities
antifraud provision of the federal securities laws.”).
361. The origin of the term “blue sky” “indicates the evil at which it is aimed; that is . . .
speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky.” Hall v. Geiger-
Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917) (quotations omitted). For a fuller discussion on the origin
of this term, see Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud
Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 279 n.15 (1998).
362. See Mark A. Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 471, 473 & n.8 (1993).
363. See id. at 473–74.
364. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996) (codified throughout various sections of 15
U.S.C.).
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contract.365 Defrauded investors thus generally opted for the more lenient
requirements of Rule 10b-5. However, state antifraud provisions threatened
to take center stage after passage of the PSLRA in 1995. With the tightening
of pleading requirements and other procedural changes, securities plaintiffs
looked to state courts to escape the PSLRA’s new requirements.366 The
escape was short-lived; in 1998 Congress passed the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), which preempted most securities fraud
class actions brought in state court.367 The law, which effectively reinstates
Rule 10b-5 as the primary avenue for relief from securities fraud, applies to
nationally-traded securities and enables federal courts to put a stay on
discovery in state individual fraud actions.368 In a particularly defendant-
friendly move, SLUSA allows defendants to remove the state court class
actions to federal court for dismissal, rather than wait for the state court to
resolve the issue.369
For most investor-plaintiffs, SLUSA has eliminated the option of
pursuing blue sky claims instead of Rule 10b-5 actions. However, employees
may be less likely to need the class action procedural advantages of 10b-5
actions than public investors. While employees in large corporations may
find it necessary to use the class action, employees in smaller firms may not
need such aggregating mechanisms. In addition, other traditional blue sky
law requirements will not faze the employee-investor; for example, in the
traditional option grant, employees will clearly be in privity with the issuer.370
State blue sky antifraud provisions thus appear to be a fruitful avenue for
employees in smaller and/or privately-traded companies.
However, there is one cloud lurking in this blue sky371 for employees—a
familiar one. State antifraud provisions are focused on protecting buyers of
365. See David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1998: The Sun Sets on California’s Blue Sky Laws, 54 BUS. LAW. 1, 14–15 (1998).
366. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-803, at 14 (1998).
367. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified throughout various sections of 15
U.S.C.).
368. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r(a), 77v(b)(4) (2000); Levine & Pritchard, supra note 365, at 22,
26. A stay of discovery was issued in the Enron federal securities class action against a state
action in Texas. See Newby v. Enron Corp., No. Civ. A. H-01-3624, 2002 WL 1001056 (S.D. Tex.
May 1, 2002).
369. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2000).
370. The need to show reliance, however, could ultimately prove difficult for employees.
Employees may not be able to show they were specifically aware of the fraudulent statements
made by the company. They may also have difficulty showing they were considering other jobs,
or that the value of their options was the only thing keeping them at the firm.
371. I can’t believe I just wrote that. However, I’m not the first. See, e.g., William L. Doerler,
SEC v. Life Partners, Inc.: An Extended Interpretation of the Howey Test Finds that Viatical Settlements
are Investment Contracts, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 253, 253 (1997) (“What was once covered by ‘blue-
sky’ laws is now covered by dark clouds as the district court rains on LPI’s parade and on the
rest of the viatical settlement industry.”); Kurt M. Saunders, Proof of Fault in Actions for Securities
Fraud: A Cloud in Pennsylvania’s Blue Sky, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 1083 (1985).
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securities—namely, those who have obtained their security through a
purchase. Thus, if the definition of “purchase” tracks the definition in Rule
10b-5, employees will once again be unable to meet the requirements for
standing. The civil fraud provision in the Uniform Securities Act of 1956,
which was adopted by over 30 states, limits relief to the buyers of
securities.372 California Corporations Code section 25,400, which is
considered one of the most plaintiff-friendly state antifraud provisions,
requires that the fraud be “for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale
of such security.”373 It is possible, of course, that state courts would reject the
federal analysis and decide that employees who receive options have
obtained them through a purchase or sale.374 However, given the potential
“purchase-or-sale” exclusion, state blue sky laws do not appear to offer
employees a reliable alternative to Rule 10b-5.
3. State Common Law
Absent the protection of the securities laws, employees may bring
actions based on state common law: breach of contract, fraud, deceit, or
even negligent misrepresentation. However, such common law remedies do
not provide the same protections as Rule 10b-5. As the Supreme Court has
noted, “an important purpose of the federal securities statutes was to rectify
perceived deficiencies in the available common law protections by
establishing higher standards of conduct in the securities industry.”375 In
several important respects, the common law falls short of federal securities
law. 376 First, Rule 10b-5 extends beyond the common law definition of fraud
to include misleading omissions that would not generally rise to a common
law offense.377 Negligent misrepresentation may cover such omissions, but
the scope of that tort varies considerably from state to state.378 Second, Rule
10b-5 actions presume that the investor has relied on defendant’s false or
372. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410, 7C U.L.A. 102, 266–67 (1956) (amended 1958) (repealed
1985); JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 138, at 1448.
373. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25,400 (2002).
374. Cf. StorMedia Inc. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 214 (Cal. 1999) (finding that defendant
firm had manipulated the market by “selling” stock to employees through an employee stock
purchase plan, even though the sales were not on the open market).
375. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983); see also SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
376. As one state court noted, the purpose of securities regulation is to “afford the victims
of securities fraud with a remedy without the formidable task of proving common law fraud.”
Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568, 580 (Cal. 1993) (quoting Bowden v. Robinson, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 871, 878 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)).
377. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2002).
378. See, e.g., Bily v. Arthur Young and Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992) (finding accountants
not liable for negligent misrepresentation to third parties); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174
N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) (same).
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misleading actions through the “fraud-on-the-market” theory.379 However,
state common law actions require proof of reliance.380 Thus, individual
employees would need to show some form of reliance on the fraudulent
statements—actual knowledge of those statements, for example, and the
consideration of those statements in their own valuation of the option.
Finally, as a federal cause of action, Rule 10b-5 provides access to federal
courts and to federal class action procedures. Although the PSLRA
tightened up those procedures, they still afford plaintiffs an aggregation
mechanism that may not be available under state common law.381 Ultimately,
state common law does not appear to offer employees an adequate
substitute for the Rule 10b-5 private cause of action.
4. ERISA
ERISA provides that fiduciaries of employee benefit plans must exercise
“care, skill, prudence, and diligence” in overseeing such plans,382 and
provides for liability if a fiduciary participates in, conceals, or even simply
knows about a breach of fiduciary duty without taking steps to remedy it.383
Employees with stock options could potentially sue for fraud committed by
plan fiduciaries if ERISA applied to their stock option plans. However, stock
options, whether provided individually or through a plan, are neither
welfare plans nor pension plans, and thus do not fall under ERISA’s
purview.
ERISA provides coverage for “employee benefit plans,” which it divides
into two groups: employee welfare benefit plans and employee pension
benefit plans.384 Employee welfare benefit plans are defined as those plans
which provide benefits relating to certain employee needs: “medical,
surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness,
accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits,
apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship
funds, or prepaid legal services.” 385 Courts have universally held that stock
379. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241 (1988) (“Because most publicly available
information is reflected in market price, an investor’s reliance on any public material
misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.”).
380. See, e.g., Kaufman v. i-Stat Corp., 754 A.2d 1188, 1201 (N.J. 2000) (rejecting the fraud-
on-the-market theory to satisfy the reliance requirement for a state common-law fraud action).
The court noted that “no . . . state appellate court had permitted the fraud-on-the-market
theory to satisfy the reliance requirement of common-law fraud.” Id. at 1191.
381. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000).
382. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000).
383. Id. § 1105(a).
384. Id. § 1002(3). A plan must be either a welfare benefit plan or a pension benefit plan to
be covered. See Kaelin v. Tenneco, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 478, 484–85 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (citing
authority from five circuits).
385. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000). Also included are benefits “described in [section] 302(c)
of the Labor Management Relations Act,” which relates to collective bargaining costs and
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option plans do not provide any such benefits and thus cannot be
considered welfare plans.386
An employee pension benefit plan “(i) provides retirement income to
employees or (ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods
extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond.”387 Thus, a
plan must push benefits back to either retirement or the termination of
employment in order to be considered a pension benefit plan. In
regulations concerning this definition, the Department of Labor specified
that the definition of pension plan “shall not include payments made by an
employer to some or all of its employees as bonuses for work performed,
unless such payments are systematically deferred to the termination of
covered employment or beyond, or so as to provide retirement income to
employees.”388 Although individual plans may be tailored to a variety of
purposes, stock option plans are generally not established as a means of
providing retirement income. Instead, such plans provide employees with
options to purchase employer stock much earlier than retirement.389 Unless
a stock option plan provides that the options cannot be exercised until
retirement or employment termination, it does not fit within the definition
of a pension plan.
Federal courts have overwhelmingly found that bonus plans such as
stock option plans, phantom stock plans, or other bonus plans are not
pension plans. In one of the earliest decisions on this issue, the Fifth Circuit
excluded from ERISA coverage a bonus plan which provided employees with
the right to receive a fraction of the proceeds from a certain project.390 The
court acknowledged that “while the primary thrust of the plan is to reward
employees during their active years, payments to some employees . . . are
likely to continue after the employee has retired or ceased work because of
death or disability.”391 However, the court determined that “the mere fact
that some payments under a plan may be made after an employee has
benefit plans established through collective bargaining.
386. See, e.g., Estate of McCloone v. Intel Corp., 1 Fed. Appx. 715, 716 (9th Cir. 2001),
Oatway v. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., 27 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2404 (D. Del. 2002),
Goodrich v. CML Fiberoptics, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 48 (D. Mass. 1998); see also U.S. Dep’t of Labor,
Op. Letter No. 79-80A, 1979 WL 7016, at *3 (Nov. 13, 1979).
387. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2000).
388. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(c) (2002).
389. Generally, stock option plans require a three to five year vesting period before
employees can exercise their options. See BLASI ET AL., supra note 3, at 64–65. Thereafter,
employees are free to exercise their options (i.e., buy the stock at the option price) and then
sell the stock itself. In a study of the behavior of 50,000 in eight firms who gave their employees
stock options, ninety percent of the employees who exercised their options sold the underlying
stock immediately thereafter. Id. at 66.
390. Murphy v. Inexco Oil Co., 611 F.2d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 1980).
391. Id. at 574.
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retired or left the company does not result in ERISA coverage.”392 Because
payments under the plan began immediately, the court concluded that the
plan provided current rather than retirement income. Similarly, the Tenth
Circuit held in Emmenegger v. Bull Moose Tube Co.393 that a phantom stock
plan that allowed employees to redeem their shares any time after vesting
was not a pension plan, despite the possibility that participants would not
redeem their shares until after retirement.394 Courts considering the
application of ERISA to employee stock option plans have followed this
analysis.395
A stock option plan may be considered a pension plan if it becomes a de
facto method of deferring income to retirement or termination. ERISA
provides that a bonus plan may result in the deferral of income “by its
express terms or as a result of the surrounding circumstances.”396 A
Department of Labor opinion letter outlined what such circumstances could
potentially be:
For example, the manner in which bonus percentages are
negotiated by employees yearly may allocate the economic benefits
earned in a year disproportionately to retirees and participants
reaching retirement age as defined under the Plan; an inordinate
percentage of the bonus recipients may be at one time at or nearly
at retirement age; and payments may not be made under the plan
often enough or within a reasonable time to avoid their actually
serving as retirement income. Furthermore, if the plan is
communicated to participants in a manner that causes them to act
under the Plan so as to result in their deferring receipt of income
until retirement, it may be deemed a pension plan.397
However, courts have yet to find that the circumstances surrounding
any particular stock option plan (or other stock-related bonus plan) have
392. Id. at 575. The court memorably wrote that the definition of a pension plan is “not to
be read as an elastic girdle that can be stretched to cover any content that can conceivably fit
within its reach.” Id.
393. 197 F.3d 929 (10th Cir. 1999).
394. Id. at 933; see also Hahn v. Nat’l Westminister Bank, 99 F. Supp. 2d 275, 279 (E.D.N.Y.
2000) (discussing a phantom stock plan) (“The mere fact that payments made pursuant to a
plan continue after retirement does not transform an otherwise excluded bonus plan into one
whose payments are ‘systematically deferred’ to the termination of employment or one whose
purpose is to provide retirement income.”).
395. See Oatway v. Am. Int’l Group, 27 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2404 (D. Del. Feb. 5,
2002); Raskin v. CyNet, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 906, 910 (S.D. Tex. 2001); Butzburger v.
Halliburton Co., No. Civ. A. 399CV2169R, 2001 WL 1636357, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2001);
Long v. Excel Telecomms. Corp., No. Civ. A. 3:98-CV3015G, 2000 WL 1562808, at *4 (N.D. Tex.
Oct. 18, 2000); Goodrich, 990 F. Supp. at 49–50; Int’l Paper Co. v. Suwyn, 978 F. Supp. 506, 511–
12 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Op. Letter No. 79-80A, supra note 386, at *3.
396. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2000).
397. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Op. Letter No. 98-02A, 1998 Westlaw 103654, at *2 (March 6, 1998).
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rendered the plan a pension plan.398 Indeed, it seems unlikely that stock
option plans would ever meet these circumstances. Stock options are
designed not to provide for retirement, but to provide employees with an
incentive to work harder for the company. While employers often stagger
vesting of the options over several years, vesting generally takes place within
five years, and many options have an expiration date after which they cannot
be exercised.399 As courts have frequently noted, the stated purpose of most
stock option plans is to provide an incentive to employees to “promote the
interests of the [employers] and their stockholder[s] by aligning the
interests of [employees] . . . with those of the stockholder[s].”400 Moreover,
stock option plans are ill-suited to be retirement funds, given their lack of
diversification. Recent events involving employees from Enron and Lucent
have demonstrated the danger in concentrating pension fund investments
in employer securities. A pension fund that consisted solely of employer
stock or stock options, with the exception of employee stock ownership
plans, would fail to meet the fiduciary duty of diversification.401
Stock options are just one form of employee investment in their
company. It may seem inconsistent that employees are protected by ERISA
when they invest in an ESOP or buy employer stock through a 401(k) plan,
but not when they receive stock options through a plan. However, ERISA is
not the proper regulatory vehicle for employee stock options, as option
plans are generally not retirement funds. Perhaps the problem is not that
stock options are not covered, but that other employee investments in their
employer are.402 The difficulties in reconciling ERISA with ESOPs, which are
explicitly covered by ERISA, demonstrate that ERISA would be an awkward
regulatory tool for stock option plans.403 Instead of retirement funds,
employee stock options should be treated as securities, embedded with the
protections against risk of fraud that other shareholders receive.
398. See, e.g., Emmenegger, 197 F.3d at 933.
399. In order to qualify for special tax treatment, options must have a limit requiring that
they be exercised within ten years, five years, or twenty-seven months. See 26 U.S.C. §§
422(b)(2), 423(b)(7) (2000).
400. Emmenegger, 197 F.3d at 931; see also Long, 2000 WL 1562808, at *3 (noting that the
purpose of the plan is to “provide incentives for [employees] to exert maximum efforts for the
success of the Company”); Suwyn, 978 F. Supp. at 511 (providing that the purpose of the plan is
“to provide incentive . . . to improve the performance of the Company on a long-term basis”).
401. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2000). However, employees are free to self-direct their
funds into employer securities through § 401(k) plans. For a critique of this provision, see
Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress’ Misguided Decision to Leave 401(k) Plan
Participants to their own Devices, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 361 (2002).
402. But cf. Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments in Employer Securities: More Is Not Always
Better, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 61 (1998) (arguing that ERISA should limit the percentage of
employer securities that may be held by a pension plan).
403. See, e.g., Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 568 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[I]ndeed, by its very
nature an ESOP places employee retirement assets at much greater risk than does the typical
diversified ERISA plan.”) (citation omitted).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The sight of executives from Adelphia, Enron, and WorldCom being
led off in handcuffs may provide a sense of vindication to defrauded
investors. However, our system provides monetary relief through
compensation obtained by civil suits. Massive securities fraud actions are well
underway against these companies and many others—actions designed to
make investors whole again. If employees are excluded from such actions on
the ill-conceived distinction between individual negotiations and group
plans, the system will have failed them, permitting them to be defrauded
without any avenue for obtaining civil justice.
Access to Rule 10b-5 is no small matter. As investors line up to bring
civil actions against the many companies plagued by corporate scandal,
employees with stock options will be the lone group unable to pursue
relief.404 Given that these employees may have also lost their jobs and
suffered losses to their retirement plans, they may in fact be in a far worse
position than public investors seeking relief. Moreover, Rule 10b-5 private
actions not only provide compensation for past victims; they provide
deterrence against future perpetrators. Along with the thousands of current
employees without Rule 10b-5 protection are the many thousands more to
come. Even under the currently poor economic conditions, more
technology firms are increasing their stock option grants this year than are
reducing them.405 If employees are unable to seek redress for fraud in
connection with a stock option grant, future employers will know that their
deception of employees with regard to such grants will be exempt from Rule
10b-5 litigation.
Employees are different than public investors in many important ways,
but they are not immune to fraud. The main purpose of employee stock
options is to align the interests of employees with the interests of investors. If
employees are expected to act like investors, they are entitled to basic
investor protections. With the crisis of confidence that current events have
engendered about our financial system, the exclusion of certain employees
from Rule 10b-5 presents one more example of insiders out-gaming the little
guy. In the current wave of corporate reform, this problem should not be
overlooked.
404. It appears that Enron employees have only brought securities litigation based on the
stock they purchased or received, not their stock options. See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp., No.
Civ. H-01-3624, 2002 WL 31989193 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2002).
405. A survey of technology firms in the western United States shows that nearly three in
ten (28%) technology firms are increasing the number of awards, while only 19% are
decreasing the number of awards. See William M. Mercer Inc., Press Release, Tech Firms Continue
to Refine Compensation Programs, July 12, 2002, available at http://www.mercerhr.com/
pressrelease/details.jhtml?idContent=1062030 (last visited Jan. 27, 2003) (on file with the Iowa
Law Review); see also BLASI ET AL., supra note 3, at 92 (finding that 98 out of the top 100 high
tech companies offer stock options to most or all of their employees).
